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UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS GROUP

TIGRAY AND NORTH WOLLO

SITUATION REPORT

APRIL-MAY 1992

PART I

RELIEF OPERATIONS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE PERIOD JANUARY-MAY 1992 AND BELG CROP CONDITIONS

Based on a field visit of 3 March to 11 April, 1992
and research in Addis Ababa during May 1992

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

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FOREWORD

Since this report was finished, press releases from REST and RRC have been issued to try to bring attention to the serious problems of insufficient food in the pipeline for Tigray and Wollo. Conditions in North Wollo are of special concern, because so little of the planned food has been reaching the area. As I will show in the following report, donor pledges were made without enough attention to turning them into shipments which would arrive in time. There has been competition for the attention of donors from new relief needs elsewhere in the world, something which has relegated the needs in Tigray and North Wollo to low priority, even though there was general agreement on the estimated food aid needs for the two regions in late 1991.

A major significance of the current relief programme in its planned form was that it would assist the communities involved as they made the transition to a rehabilitation stage following the end of the war. As little in the way of development funds are forthcoming for the two regions, for reasons which are examined in Part II of this report, food aid plays an important role as the base of this rehabilitation phase.

My thanks to EPPG Field Assistant Ato Fitsum Gebre-Medhin, whose contribution to this report in the form of observations during our field trip has been invaluable. I should also like to thank Ato Berhane Haile, regional head of MOA in Tigray; staff of REST in Mekelle and Addis Ababa; and the staff of various NGOs.

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NOTE ON TERMS

TPLF/ EPRDF. Though the terms are used interchangeably when referring to regional authorities in Tigray, the government in the province is more properly referred to as the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front), as the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) encompasses other political groups as well, groups who play no role in Tigray.

baito - the Tigrinya term given to the administrative council of the assemblies to which all adults of the population belong, These are organized at several levels: tabia (a group of villages, roughly equivalent to a peasants association or kebele in the rest of Ethiopia), woreda (district), and region.

shengo - local people's councils in North Wollo (equivalent of the baitos in Tigray). As the term "Shengo" in Addis Ababa is likely to be confused with the former national structure under the Derg, the expression "local people's councils" or "local councils" is used in this report, although in North Wollo the term most commonly used is shengo.

MOA/DOA. The TPLF Department of Agriculture (DOA) has been integrated with the central Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

ECS/JRP and CRS - The ECS, Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, is responsible for the operations of the JRP, Joint Relief Partnership, programme in Tigray. CRS, Catholic Relief Services, is responsible for logistics, and arranging for food deliveries to the ECS in Tigray

awraja - administrative sub-region
baito - see above
Belg - rains of the period February-April (significant in parts of North Wollo)
CAFOD - Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CRS - Catholic Relief Services
dega - highland (over 2,400 m.)
Derg - the term used to refer to the former Ethiopian government
DOA - TPLF Department of Agriculture, now part of MOA
EB - Ethiopian Birr (official exchange rate: 2.07 EB = US$1.00)
EECMY/LWF (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus/Lutheran World Federation)
EPDM - Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement, part of EPRDF
EPLF - Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERO - Ethiopian Relief Organization (relief wing of EPDM)
FAO - the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
Meher - cropping season June-September
MOA - Ministry of Agriculture
MOH - Ministry of Health
MSF Belgium/Holland - Medecins Sans Frontieres, Belgium/Holland
MSF France - Medecins Sans Frontieres, France
NGO - Non-governmental Organization
production cadres - extension workers under MOA/DOA
quintal - 100 kg
REST - The Relief Society for Tigray
RRC - Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
shengo - local people's councils in North Wollo
tabia - a group of villages, roughly equivalent to a peasants association or kebele in the rest of Ethiopia
teff - cereal cultivated in Ethiopia
TPLF - Tigray People's Liberation Front
WFP - UN World Food Programme
woreda - district

Geographical names: by the end of the war, there had been several de facto changes of boundaries of areas that had been under TPLF or EPRDF/TPLF control for several years. This means that parts of North Gondar and North Wollo are considered part of Tigray. For the most part, awraja names in North Wollo in this report use pre-1988 boundaries. Please see maps at the end of the report.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Part I of this Situation Report for Tigray and North Wollo for April/May 1992 is a report on the current relief operations and crop conditions during the Belg season. It is both a field report based on a lengthy visit to the two regions in March and April, and an examination of the Addis Ababa end of the relief operations, to show how donors respond to their perceptions of the conditions and needs in the two regions, and how the central offices of the relief agencies deal with operational details. Part II, in the form of a separate document, is an examination of the general economic situation in Tigray and North Wollo, with a focus on agricultural development issues, trade, changing social conditions, relations between regional authorities and central ministries, and further observations on donor response to development needs.

2. There was slow donor response to the relief operation in Tigray and North Wollo this year, partly because of a cautious holding back of funds and resources by donors while they wait to see how the new political situation evolves. Other factors affecting timing and amount of response have been monetary and administrative constraints within donor headquarter offices, and the impact of recession on their economies, which has meant less money available for overseas assistance. There are also competing demands in other countries. As a result, though there was recognition this year of the food aid needs of Ethiopia, and of Tigray and North Wollo in particular, pledges took a very long time to be turned into specific consignments.

3. The relief operations of the JRP (Joint Relief Partnership) were reorganized at the beginning of the year, and the JRP Southern Line which had been run as a combined programme during and immediately after the war was divided into its component parts. The relief programme in North Wollo is now handled by EECMY/LWF (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus/Lutheran World Federation). The previous JRP operation in Tigray is handled by ECS (Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat). REST (Relief Society of Tigray) covers approximately half the needs in Tigray.

4. In the North Wollo programme, the poor food pipeline means that lack of stocks are the major constraint. But the relief operation has not been effectively run due to other factors as well, and there is a need for careful internal assessment of the operation. JRP needs to be encouraged to give more detailed reporting on the operation, including analysis of the constraints faced. This report tries to fill in some of that gap. During the war monitoring possibilities were limited. Now more effort must be made to keep up the credibility of the programme, by careful monitoring and reporting, for the sake of the beneficiaries. JRP hopes to increase the number of monitors.

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5. The current relief operation must be seen in relationship to the traditional coping mechanisms and famine survival strategies of the population of Tigray and North Wollo, such as migration in search of work, and the sale of animals. Relief programmes are currently a major part of rehabilitation for the area, especially as so little in the way of rehabilitation or development funds are being put into the two regions. An added burden in many areas are people returning from resettlement areas, or from elsewhere in the country, including ex-soldiers.

6. Establishing even approximate population figures for North Wollo has been a serious problem for government officials, relief organizations, and food assessment missions. An appendix to this report attempts to bring together all the information available, and to compare it with estimated needs. For too long we have been operating in the dark in North Wollo because of the lack of data. For Tigray population figures, though earlier CSA (Central Statistical Authority) estimates may have been underestimates, TPLF figures in turn may be high estimates. WFP/FAO unofficial estimates for the population of Tigray in 1989/90 were about a million less than the TPLF figure of 4.8 million.

7. The current non-arrival of needed supplies has interrupted relief operations, especially in North Wollo. The precarious pipeline for the immediate future means that careful planning, especially to cover the needs of the rainy season, is not possible. Some of the constraints facing two of the major donors, EEC and USAID, with regard to the food pipeline are described. The pipeline for the Tigray and North Wollo operation may improve in July or August when large delayed American shipments arrive. In general, donors recognize that serious problems are caused because of delays, but apparently little can be done. For JRP, a problem aside from the insufficient amount of food arriving in Assab lies in the rate of off-take from the port.

8. An analysis is given of the breakup of the JRP Southern Line into its component parts at the beginning of the year. Though EECMY/LWF is now the coordinating group for activity in North Wollo, other members of the JRP are active in the distribution of rations: EOC (Ethiopian Orthodox Church) in Wag and Sekota, and the ECS (Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat) in Kobo and Alamata. The break-up of the JRP Southern Line operation led to longer delays than foreseen in restarting the operation, especially in North Wollo, where there was a break of nearly three months. The JRP as a group still coordinates the operations from Addis Ababa. The JRP committee is made up of representatives of the agencies involved, and meets on several levels. Each month the committee allocates food to the different JRP programmes. The bottleneck for individual agencies responsible for specific areas is getting the food to their distribution points, which requires the knowledge of how and who to push. Some member agencies are more experienced and more energetic at this than others.

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9. The description of the relief operation in Tigray focusses on the ECS/JRP programme. The ECS/JRP operational area since the beginning of the year was Raya and Azebo, Enderta, and Kilte Awlalo awrajas. REST covers needs in the awrajas of Adwa, Axum, Temben, Shire, Wolkait, and Agame. In early June discussions were under way concerning whether ECS/JRP would again cover Agame. The two agencies use different approaches in their operations regarding ration size, the physical numbers handled at individual distributions, and the number of distribution sites. (REST uses its larger off-road trucking capacity to bring food to more distribution sites than in the JRP area). In March there did not appear to be very close coordination between the two agencies in Tigray, though this seemed to have improved by May. ECS figures were excluded from REST reports, and it has been confusing for donors to not be given the full information in one report. REST suggests that this is the responsibility of RRC. An attempt has been made in Appendixes to this report to collate as much information as possible from the REST and ECS/JRP.

10. The ECS/JRP target is 681,288 beneficiaries a month. The REST target for July-December is 805,394 beneficiaries. Thus the total target for the period July-December is 1,486,682 people. Detailed distribution figures for Tigray are given in an Appendix. Though it took some time for the ECS/JRP operation to become a smoothly working one, by March and April a larger part of the target needs in ECS/JRP areas were being met.

11. REST distributions in the parts of Tigray which they serve were overall on schedule during the first few months of the year. The REST staff was concerned that not enough food stocks would be moved to Temben in time for a three month ration distribution ahead of the rains in June/July, when the many rivers in the area make travel very difficult. Storage facilities in Temben are poor. In general, attention is needed to upgrade storage facilities which may have been satisfactory under the difficult conditions of the war, but must now be judged by other standards.

12. There has been little response as yet to REST's repeated request for support for its internal purchase scheme, to buy grain from a few surplus areas in Tigray (mostly in Wolkait awraja in the west) for distribution elsewhere in the region. As REST recognizes, the lack of response is due mostly to the unfavourable official exchange rate.

13. In the JRP operation in Tigray in the past, all decisions were made in Addis Ababa. Even at the time the JRP Southern Line was being dissolved, it appears that not enough information about what was available was given to the field level for them to be able to plan properly. It appears that the ECS/JRP operation continues to be managed from Addis Ababa, which has tended to delay certain necessary decisions in the programme. Thus the Mekelle office does not have the freedom to divert deliveries to

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where it feels the greatest needs are. There are still communication problems, in spite of telex facilities in place. Telephone connections are difficult, and thus there is no direct daily interaction with Addis Ababa or Dessie transport office.

14. Examples of specific problems faced by the beneficiaries in the area covered by the ECS/JRP relief operation in Tigray are described, including the long distance up the mountain that people from Mahoni and Chercher must walk to receive relief supplies in Maichew, a walk of ten hours or longer for those from Chercher. REST had been told by ECS that the JRP programme cannot afford the extra transport costs to move food by truck to Mahoni. (This could perhaps be brought up with the donors who provide handling and transport costs for their food donations.)

15. In the description of the North Wollo JRP operation, population figures are compared for two awrajas where roughly the same crop conditions prevailed, Wag and Lasta. JRP estimated needs are disproportionately higher in comparison to population estimates in Wag, at 77% of the population, than they are in Lasta, where the JRP estimate of those in need is equivalent to 16% of the estimated population. The proportion of the estimated population of Raya and Kobo listed as in need of assistance also appears high (73%), and though we do not question the numbers for the lowland areas, where serious crop failure was experienced last year, highland figures should perhaps be investigated. JRP might consider the reallocation of some of the amount of food available to areas now receiving relatively less coverage. On the operational side, due to the shortages in food stocks, JRP distributions in April were only able to meet 50% of the estimated needs; by May this had slipped to 36% of the target. No priorities are set for periods when not enough food was available, except for the priority of moving food to Wag and Lasta ahead of the rain. Even this has not been possible to the extent hoped for.

16. General details on rainfall and crop conditions in the Belg growing areas are given. The Belg rains of February-April normally play a much more significant role in North Wollo than in most of Tigray. In North Wollo they started in January, a month earlier than usual, but by mid-February stopped for over a month. The long dry spell in February and March had a very negative impact on Belg crops, even where rain fell again later. By the end of Belg rainy season the picture was generally very poor in areas where farmers traditionally try to grow Belg crops. A limited area of southern Tigray received Belg rain, but a less extensive area was planted than last year. Late Belg rain in other areas of Tigray made it possible for ploughing to begin in preparation for the Meher planting. Details per awraja are given for North Wollo and Tigray. A major factor in the crop conditions at the end of the Belg rains was whether fields had been planted early or late. Therefore the impact of the continuing lack of enough plough oxen in the whole area is very evident.

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II. INTRODUCTION

1. Previous Situation Reports on Tigray and North Wollo have concentrated on "the view from the field". In this current report, though details from a field visit to Tigray and North Wollo in March and early April are given, an attempt is also made to examine the other end of the relief operations, to show how donors in Addis Ababa and at headquarters respond to their perceptions of the conditions and needs in the two regions, and how the central offices of the relief agencies deal with the operational details. Part I is thus a monitoring report on the relief operation from these various sides. Some notes on crop conditions towards the end of the Belg season are included. Part II, in the form of a separate document, is an examination of the general economic situation in Tigray and North Wollo, with a focus on agricultural development issues, trade, changing social conditions, and relations between regional authorities and central ministries.

2. Some of the slow donor response to the relief operation in Tigray and North Wollo appears to relate to the way donors view Ethiopia and the Transitional Government as a whole. There is a cautious holding back of funds and resources while they wait to see how the new political situation evolves. Thus political factors played a role in delaying decisions about donations, decisions which had to pass through the American Congress or the complex EEC bureaucracy. Perhaps equally significant factors affecting response have been the monetary and administrative constraints within donor headquarter offices, which are dealing with the impact of recession in their own economies and resulting lower amounts of money being available for overseas assistance. They are also dealing with the bureaucracy of their own systems, and competing pressing demands for relief assistance for other parts of the world, especially Southern Africa, Somalia, and Eritrea. There was certainly recognition this year on the part of the donors of the food aid needs of Ethiopia, and of Tigray and North Wollo in particular, to the extent that general pledges were made early in the year. But donor interest is not enough on its own, and pledges took a very long time to be turned into specific consignments. As a result, the current relief operation in North Wollo has not reached even close to target numbers for several months, and the operation in Tigray may face problems in the coming months.

3. This report gives a brief analysis of the operational system of the relief programmes for the two regions, to show where some of the bottlenecks are, and how these affect the running of the programmes. It includes a short description of how JRP, the Joint Relief Partnership, works, and looks at the break up of the JRP Southern Line into its component parts at the beginning of the year as an example of how new factors have come into play. The continuing problems of the food pipeline and logistical and

7. The problems caused by lack of coordination and other administrative constraints are secondary compared to the problem of the absence of a sufficient food pipeline. But had there been enough food, these other factors might still have caused problems. The poor pipeline of food also brings up questions about the role of those coordinating the relief operation, both in the JRP and among donors/UN groups in Addis Ababa, with regard to effective pressure being imposed at the right time to make sure that donor support was turned into shipments. Some observers suggest that more could have been done to try to solve the bottleneck at Assab port. As one relief agency head has put it, the only thing that saved the relief operation in Tigray and North Wollo in the early part of this year was the high amount of carry-over stocks, and undelivered pledges for 1991 which arrived since the beginning of the year.

8. As a final word of introduction, the current relief operation must be seen in relationship to the traditional coping mechanisms and famine survival strategies of the population of Tigray and North Wollo. These strategies are examined in depth in the work of Alex de Waal and Dessalegn Rahmato. Two major strategies which were very clearly in operation in the region were migration in search of work, and the sale of animals.

III. RELIEF OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

1. A problem facing people in both regions, which was discussed in previous reports but is now causing a greater impact than ever, is the presence of people returning from resettlement areas, or from elsewhere in the country. Returning ex-soldiers, though not in very large numbers, were frequently described as a special problem in North Wollo, as assistance programmes for them in place in other parts of the country had not expanded to cover this region.

2. Relief programmes must be seen as a major part of rehabilitation for the area, especially as so little in the way of rehabilitation or development funds are being put into the two regions. In some areas receiving rations enables farmers to purchase seed or small animals to begin to build up livestock holdings. Supplies of food aid which enter the market for this reason, or because beneficiaries sell in order to purchase other food in their home areas, are important to those not qualifying for aid, by keeping the price of relief wheat down. At the same time, prices for relief grain are not especially low (with the exception of Sekota), and thus we did not see any evidence of significant distortions to prices of locally grown cereals as a result.

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3. Some observers have commented on what they felt to be good supplies of food in the markets of Tigray in the early part of the year. It is the argument of this report that this is due partly to the sales mentioned above, but also to the factor of seasonality: the few months immediately following a harvest are traditionally not serious months, even in years of low harvests, and reasonable food supplies in the market are thus normal for this time of year. Access to these food supplies is limited to those with money. Conclusions about overall needs for the remainder of the year cannot be drawn from the existence of some cereal stocks in the market, and even in this early part of the year, many beneficiaries were fully dependent on relief rations. As a large amount of community work is being done in Tigray (discussed in Part II), practically none of the beneficiaries are inactive passive recipients of food aid, and it is difficult to argue that in this area the food aid acts as a disincentive for work on the farms. In North Wollo, supplies of relief food are too unreliable for farmers to decide not to prepare and work their land, though in some cases rations may make it easier for individuals to leave their families, knowing they have some food resources, in order to search for off-farm employment.

4. The transition out of dependency on relief food and into the use of food aid for development purposes is a goal of many of those working in relief programmes in Tigray and North Wollo. In Tigray this looks more possible within the next year than in North Wollo (though this will depend on rain conditions). All the same, this dependency is not something that can be cut suddenly, and some people involved in the relief operations suggest that it cannot happen in one or two years. Besides the administration needed to set up other kinds of programmes utilizing food aid, peasants will only believe that food rations are going to stop when they do not arrive for a few months in a row.

Population Figures

5. Establishing even approximate population figures for North Wollo has been a serious problem for government officials, relief organizations, and food assessment missions. An attempt has been made in Appendix 1 of this report to bring together all the information available, and to compare it with estimated needs according to the JRP and RRC, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Part of what is presented in the Appendix in terms of analysis of estimated population figures is pre-assessment work, so that this information is available to act as a basis for the next assessment of needs in November and December, and forms part of "risk mapping" for the area. For too long we have been operating in the dark in North Wollo because of the lack of data.

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6. For Tigray, more detailed information is available in the various reports of agencies who worked in the previous cross-border operation. These are based on a TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) census made under difficult war conditions, thus may be revised by the time of the next census. Current Central Statistical Authority attempts to establish new population estimates for the two areas will be of help in the future. Though many feel that earlier CSA (Central Statistical Authority) estimates were underestimates, TPLF also had reasons for accepting high estimates from the baitos, or local councils, who contributed to the Tigray census. WFP/FAO unofficial estimates for the population of Tigray in 1989/90 when trying to establish food needs were about a million less than the TPLF figure of 4.8 million, though there may have been differences in the regional boundaries used. Not only have local estimates of population numbers always been rather vague in all parts of Ethiopia, but there was of course a political element to the figures being used by both sides in the regions which were not under government control during the civil war. More analysis of population figures is given in Section III.H on the JRP operation in North Wollo.

B. FOOD PIPELINE

7. As mentioned above, food aid needs for Tigray and North Wollo for 1992 were identified early, but not acted upon by donor headquarters in good time, and the current non-arrival of needed supplies has interrupted relief operations, especially in North Wollo. The precarious pipeline for the immediate future means that careful planning, especially to cover the needs of the rainy season, is not possible. Although the pledging situation had improved by early June, JRP reported that only 12% of pledges to their programmes in Tigray and North Wollo had so far been received. Because of this, there was a possibility of having to cut rations, or numbers receiving help, in the next two months, until shipments in July received. This will affect the North Wollo operation more than the Tigray programme.

8. A brief summary of some of the constraints facing two of the major donors with regard to the food pipeline is as follows:

9. By early June EEC pledges for the whole of the Ethiopia programme totaled 263,212 MT (not including 75,000 MT of bilateral aid which is to be monetized as part of its structural food aid programme). Only a small portion of this amount had reached Ethiopia by the end of May. The explanation given by the EEC for the slowdown in shipments this year was that their headquarters in Brussels had been looking at high port stocks and low off-take from Assab earlier in the year, and in consequence had given priority to more urgently needed shipments for other relief operations, where port stocks were not so high. They had also been acting on the annual recommendation from WFP to not

time shipments to coincide with the period when fertilizer is received in the port in large quantities, as the fertilizer needs to have priority for transport during this period. (The recommendation is made at the same time that donors are urged to time shipments so that they arrive either before or after the fertilizer - this year, not enough food aid was sent ahead of the period of peak fertilizer arrivals). Though this explains some of the delay, some observers suggest that the real culprit is the sluggish EEC bureaucracy, and unexplained delays in approving the second tranche of food aid for Ethiopia. The food aid pledge was very generous when it was finally approved. An EEC representative suggests that the fact that there are EEC pledges committed means that the agencies they assist can borrow from in-country stocks against these pledges. The agencies point out that they need firm delivery dates of future shipments to be able to give repayment dates to whatever agencies they might borrow from. (Swaps and borrowing were a common but extremely complicated way of dealing with delayed arrivals of shipments over the past few years.) The EEC is a major supporter of JRP through LWF.

10. USAID shipments were also much later getting organized than usual. This appears to have been because of political factors delaying agreement on the amount to be pledged, and the distraction of urgent needs arising because of the drought in Southern Africa. When competing demands absorb the attention of headquarters offices (USAID is only one of several donors who fall into this category), sharing of information with country offices seems to suffer. The total amount of food aid pledged by USAID is 170,000 MT to the whole Ethiopian programme.

11. The pipeline for the Tigray and North Wollo operation may improve in July and August when large delayed American shipments arrive. In general, donors recognize that serious problems are caused because of delays, but apparently little can be done. There are even cases of shipments for Ethiopia (a Canadian donation for WFP for the Food Security Reserve) being diverted to Eritrea, thus pipeline problems for Eritrea affect the Ethiopia operation.

12. A problem for JRP aside from the insufficient amount of food arriving in Assab lies in the rate of off-take from the port. For much of March and April average off-take of food aid was about 1,000 MT per day. Since over 10,000 MT a month through Assab is needed for Tigray (the remaining 10,000 MT a months is planned to come through Massawa), and 8,000 MT a month for North Wollo, in addition to all the food aid for other programme, this is a serious bottleneck. None of the exuses for slowdowns or non-arrivals of promised deliveries which refer to conditions in Assab explain delays in shipments to REST, which uses Massawa as the port of entry for most of its consignments.

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C. CURRENT DIVISION OF PREVIOUS JRP SOUTHERN LINE OPERATION

13. The UN/EPPG November 1991 Situation Report for Tigray and North Wollo discussed the planned breakup of the JRP operation into its component parts. This happened on schedule at the beginning of the year. Though EECMY/LWF is now the coordinating group for activity in North Wollo, other members of the JRP are active in the distribution of rations: EOC (Ethiopian Orthodox Church) in Wag and Sekota, and the ECS (Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat) in Kobo and Alamata. In Tigray, the ECS is now handling on its own what was previously covered by the combined church groups of the JRP. REST continues to cover half of the needs in Tigray. The break-up of the JRP Southern Line operation led to longer delays than foreseen in restarting the operation, especially in North Wollo, where there was a break of nearly three months in getting deliveries to some operational areas. Part of these delays were because of logistical problems moving supplies from Assab, but part appear to have been due to slow decisions on dividing food stocks and operational supplies, and other administrative matters. Though the period of the changeover was deliberately planned to coincide with the time when most people in the highland areas had food stocks from last year's harvest, these stocks are now being depleted in many areas, and the impact of decreased distributions on top of a period of receiving no help has affected the part of the population most in need.

14. The JRP as a group still coordinates the operations from Addis Ababa. The JRP committee is made up of representatives of the agencies involved, and meets on several levels. At one level logistics are discussed, and then heads of the agencies or their appointees meet to make decisions. Each month the committee allocates food to the different JRP programmes. Targets are compared to what was met the month before, and what stocks remain at regional warehouses and at distribution sites. Then allocations are made based on what is available in stock and at the port. The bottleneck for individual agencies responsible for specific areas is getting the food to their distribution points, which requires the knowledge of how and who to push, whether in transport circles, or in the port, or among government contacts. Some member agencies are more experienced and more energetic at this than others. Another problem may be that the new coordinating committee which is still working out the most effective way to dispatch supplies from Assab. It has been suggested that during the past few months they may have seen the solution as lying in moving certain "blocks" out of the port, for example moving nothing but the portion due to go to Tigray until it is finished, at the risk of not having enough moved to North Wollo destinations in time; or in focussing on movement of a certain consignment, which, like the CAFOD, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, consignments, might be earmarked for just Tigray (in contrast to most JRP consignments, which arrive unearmarked).

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15. A factor influencing the level of efficiency of the current ECS operation in Tigray (which here is referred to as the ECS/JRP operation) is that JRP decisions in the past were all made in Addis Ababa. This led to a situation in which even at the time the JRP Southern Line was being dissolved, at field level they did not have the necessary information about what was available to be able to plan properly. A change in management was also involved. Though the changes have been completed, JRP still appears to have been unable to improve its information distribution system, and the Addis Ababa level of the operation has not established a better information exchange mechanism with the field. There had been the expectation among those in the field that with end of war, the relief operation would be better organized than during the last two years; instead, people involved in the operation freely admit, it became less organized, at least in the early months of this year. We were told that coordination used to be better, and that, for instance, the Mekelle office used to get every truck number by telex, so it could follow up; this no longer happened. Because of these problems, it took a long time for the ECS/JRP operation to become a smoothly working one. Some ECS/JRP distributions continued on a limited scale in a few of their areas of Tigray in January and February, and REST stepped in to deliver food to the most needy in Raya and Azebo during this time; by March and April a larger part of the target needs in ECS/JRP areas were being met.

16. In the EECMY/JRP operation in North Wollo, (referred to here as simply the JRP operation, for the sake of convenience, and because other church partners are still involved in the programme), major changes were made at the level of decision makers at the top, as the head of EECMY who had been the former moving force behind the JRP left to take up an overseas appointment. Technical problems were faced, many to do with logistical details. Even the matter of coordinating the physical distribution took longer than expected because of disagreements between different church groups. For simple registration procedures, there appears to have problems with the paperwork, supplying stationery needs and manpower. Transport of staff in the field was a problem, as vehicles were redistributed.

D. TIGRAY - GENERAL

17. Emphasis in this analysis of the existing relief operation in Tigray is on the ECS/JRP (Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat/Joint Relief Partnership) programme, which is supplied by CRS (Catholic Relief Services) in Addis Ababa. This is because the March EPPG field visit covered mainly ECS distribution areas.

18. REST covers needs in the awrajas of Adwa, Axum, Temben, Shire, Wolkait, and Agame. The ECS/JRP operational area was Raya and Azebo, Enderta, and Kilte Awlalo. In early June discussions

were under way concerning whether ECS/JRP would again cover Agame. The two agencies use different approaches in their operations, regarding ration size, the physical numbers handled at individual distributions, and the number of distribution sites (REST uses off-road trucking capacity to bring food to more distribution sites than in the JRP area). In March there did not appear to be very close coordination between the two agencies in Tigray, though this appears to have improved by May. For the months of January to May, ECS/JRP figures were excluded from REST monthly reports. The REST information office in Addis Ababa reports that this is because its office in Mekelle has difficulty in getting the figures from ECS, but since they are available to outside monitors visiting the area, we suggest that REST should be more pro-active in approaching ECS on a regular basis to obtain these figures. There may also be an element of needing to have figures verified before inclusion, and problems because of difficult telephone and radio contact between the Mekelle and Addis Ababa offices. However it may be, it is confusing for donors to not be given the full information in one report. REST suggests that the responsibility for giving the fuller picture lies with RRC, as REST is not a coordinating agency. An attempt has been made in Appendixes to this report to collate as much information as possible from REST and ECS/JRP. REST's own statistics are now more regularly available, but some donors question recent distribution figures which too exactly reflect planned distributions in some areas. Perhaps these figures are for amounts sent on schedule to distribution centres, and actual distribution figures will appear in future REST statistics. Rarely in the past were distributions exactly on target.

19. The ECS/JRP target for the first part of the year (March/April, once large scale distributions started again) was 681,288. Until a definite decision is made about Agame, these figures will presumably apply for the next part of the year as well. The REST target for July-December for the awrajas where they are working in is 805,394 beneficiaries. Thus the total target for the period July-December is 1,486,682 people. This is approximately 380,400 less than the original estimated target for this period. As the summaries in this report are made up of information from several sources, REST or ECS/JRP figures may vary from these numbers. A breakdown of estimated needs, distributions, and comparison of needs to population estimates is given as part of Appendix 1.

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20. The following numbers of beneficiaries were reached with distributions since January:

TIGRAY RELIEF DISTRIBUTIONS, 1992

	REST			ECS/JRP			TOTAL		
	TARGET	ACTUAL	%	TARGET	ACTUAL	%	TARGET	ACTUAL	%
Jan	672,922	548,997	82%	681,288	285,873	42%	1,354,210	834,870	61%
Feb	672,922	829,050	123%	681,288	229,151	34%	1,354,210	1,058,201	78%
Mar	672,922	684,633	102%	681,288	459,644	67%	1,354,210	1,144,277	84%
Apr	691,413	725,981	105%	681,288	503,393	74%	1,372,701	1,229,374	90%

In January REST also distributed to 49,157 displaced people (three months rations each, for total of 129,471 rations). ECS/JRP also distributed rations to displaced: 5,826 in January and 9,205 in February. REST figures for January and February include some distributions to the most needy in awrajas usually covered by ECS/JRP. The actual ECS/JRP target for January and February was more realistic than targets given here, as they were in relation to the food available.

The ration used by JRP is 14.4 kg/month. The ration used by REST is 17 kg/month.

21. A problem in discussing needs is that details of the breakdown of estimated needs appear in several different versions. Figures used in this report are from the REST Addis Ababa office in May 1992, and from ECS/JRP in Mekelle in March. We were told that ECS figures do not reflect full numbers of those in need, as their quotas per area are limited by logistical constraints.

E. REST RELIEF OPERATIONS IN TIGRAY

22. Officials in REST were disturbed by the trend discussed above, that in spite of all the reassurances from donors that relief operation for Tigray would be supported through pledges to the centre for the relief needs of all of Ethiopia, this has not been turned into many actual shipments for Tigray. Delays and shortages in the relief programme were common before the end of the war, but it was not expected that they would get worse at this time.

23. REST distributions in the parts of Tigray which they serve were overall on schedule during the first few months of the year. There were only a few exceptions to this picture in the areas we visited, such as in Temben, where in March the local REST

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distribution centre in Abi Adi did not receive enough grain for the scheduled distributions, due to certain transport problems connected with road-works. Thus distributions were made to approximately 40,000 people, the worst off in the community, while the remainder waited until further stocks were available. (Part of the distributions for Temben which appear in REST statistics as distributed in March were actually received by the beneficiaries in April.) The REST staff was concerned that not enough food stocks would be moved to Temben in time for a three month ration distribution ahead of the rains in June/July, when the many rivers in the area make travel very difficult. Storage facilities in Temben are poor, and REST was encouraged by the EEC food aid monitor several months ago to put in a request to the EEC for Rubb Hall storage tents. Apparently an alternative request was prepared through USAID, which has met with delays. Attention is needed to upgrade storage facilities which may have been satisfactory under the difficult conditions of the war, but must now be judged by other standards.

24. There has been little response as yet to REST's repeated request for support for its internal purchase scheme, to buy grain from a few surplus areas in Tigray (mostly in Wolkait awraja in the west, near the Sudanese border) for distribution elsewhere in the region. As REST recognizes, the lack of response is due mostly to the unfavourable official exchange rate. There is some talk of "matching funds" which might be made available through RRC, to compensate for the poor exchange rate, but it is not clear where this money is to come from, when the central government is so short of funds. One possible supporter of the local purchase scheme questions the fact that there is no controlled way to approach the sales process, and that they are not able to negotiate on price. REST has estimated that a total of 30,000 MT of cereals are available for local purchase schemes, at a total cost for the programme, including transport, of Ethiopian Birr 26,598,300. (US$13,300,000 at the current rate of exchange). Small-scale purchases are planned with money from the Emergency Relief Desk and the Japan Joint NGO Committee for International Emergency Assistance.

F. ECS/JRP RELIEF OPERATIONS IN TIGRAY

25. Though some concern has been expressed in Tigray about the inability of the reorganized ECS part of the previous JRP Southern Line to start full distributions quickly at the beginning of the year, it is also clear that in many areas there had been enough harvest to support the people for a few months. Thus if a break in the operation was inevitable, it was best that it happened in the early part of the year, when needs were not as severe as they will be later in the year.

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26. At the beginning of the year REST assumed responsibility for the awraja of Agame, previously handled by the JRP Southern Line, on the basis that it was most easily accessible through Massawa, the port for most of the consignments to REST. (Those within ECS in Tigray who wanted to retain responsibility for Agame, a traditional area of relief and development work by the Catholic Church, argued that they could also bring supplies via Massawa.) REST is concerned that if ECS/JRP resumes responsibility for Agame there were fewer JRP distribution points than REST has had during recent months, as ECS/JRP does not have very much off-road trucking capacity assigned to Tigray. The long walks that this necessitates results, REST feels, in more beneficiaries selling large parts of their rations at the major distribution points, as it is difficult for them to move the supplies to their home areas. Distributions in March in Agame were by both REST and ECS/JRP, as the latter provided edible oil and supplementary food from its stocks in Agame, while REST distributed wheat. (This may lead to some confusion in the statistical records due to double-counting: ECS distribution figures for the month include 262,300 beneficiaries in Agame. As 4,000 MT of a CAFOD consignment coming via Massawa for ECS/JRP in June will be used for distributions in Agame in the period June/July, the question of whether ECS/JRP or REST is handling and recording distributions may be confusing for this period as well.)

27. As before, the ECS/JRP operation appears to be managed from Addis Ababa, which has tended to delay certain necessary decisions in the programme. Thus the Mekelle office does not have the freedom to divert deliveries to where it feels the greatest needs are, to respond to the information they receive from local authorities in the baitos. There are still communication problems, in spite of telex facilities in place. Telephone connections are difficult, and thus there is no direct daily interaction with Addis Ababa. Because the ECS office in Mekelle was no longer getting dispatch information from the JRP Dessie transport office, this meant that at least as of April they were not able to organize a regular distribution schedule, since they did not know when supplies were arriving. This is obviously not just a problem of communication with Dessie, since it is part of the larger problem of an uncertain pipeline and unpredictable Assab off-take, but the results are clearly both inconvenient and frustrating for the Mekelle office.

28. The ECS office in Mekelle is in need of a larger number of monitors, and appears to be understaffed in this way. The higher level administrative staff are not able to leave the office frequently enough for visits to areas being assisted. There is a willingness to know more about problems on the ground, but a lack of backup to release them for field monitoring. As this is a frequent problem in relief operations, it is not something out of

the ordinary, but in the case of Tigray, REST appears to put a higher value on this than ECS, and is more in touch with the people. More ECS field work may have been possible in recent months.

29. Examples of specific problems faced by the beneficiaries in the area covered by the ECS/JRP relief operation are as following:

30. In Maichew, when there were delays in restarting distributions in January and February, people from the hard hit lowlands demonstrated. REST made a partial distribution in January to fill the most urgent needs. Distributions by ECS/JRP started in late March. It was pointed out to us in Mahoni that even in the past relief aid was intermittent, and had come only at intervals, every two or three months. Conditions had been especially bad last year in the Mahoni area when all crops were lost before they matured, and unlike lowland areas to the south, not even much forage for animals had been harvested. (The animals in the area are fed cactus, "beles", which grows extensively on the nearby hillsides.) The local baito representatives reported that there had been poor crops from Meher rains for three years in a row.

31. The long distance that people from Mahoni and Chercher must walk to receive relief supplies in Maichew was brought up by us in discussions at various levels. There is agreement that it is not right that people must come up the mountain to Maichew from the lowland, a walk of ten hours or longer for those from Chercher, and then face the problems of getting the food the long distance home. Many sell part, even most, of their rations, or use a part of it to pay for transport by camels. We asked why trucks cannot bring it closer, at least to Mahoni. According to local baito officials, a truck was promised, but the plan did not materialize. When REST brought up the question with ECS, they were told that the JRP programme cannot afford the extra transport costs. (This could perhaps be brought up with the donors who provide handling and transport costs for their food donations.) Though Alamata in North Wollo is a shorter and easier walk from Chercher than is Maichew, it is in a different distribution programme, and faces serious problems of its own, thus the possibility of making distributions to Chercher from Alamata does not appear to be a viable alternative, though we were told that pressure had been exerted from the Tigray side for this to be considered. It was agreed in principle, but nothing was done. A decision about making a change like this would have to be made in JRP Addis Ababa.

32. When distributions take place in Maichew, people are receiving rations in a surplus area, so that supplies being sold in the market means the risk of negatively affecting the market prices for grain grown by local farmers. If rations were sold at

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a lowland distribution point, this would at least increase market supplies in a deficit area.

33. In Sinkata, the ECS/JRP distribution in March was to a massive number at one time, 62,000 beneficiaries. We were told that because the food had arrived late, all the beneficiaries of the area were called at the same time (a change of policy from earlier distributions, since 20,000 is considered to be the optimum number). It took many of the beneficiaries a day's walk to reach Sinkata, where they had to spend a full day waiting for distribution to be completed, and would spend one day to get back to their villages. We spoke to leaders from the drought affected area of Atsbi which we had visited last October, who reported that people of the area had had enough harvest from the previous year to last them for two or three months, but that now they were fully dependent on relief once more. When we tried to find out why such large distributions were taking place (the same thing was happening that day in Wukro), it was difficult to find out who had made this decision, as both ECS and REST said they had not given these instructions.

G. NORTH WOLLO - GENERAL

34. A general problem facing the JRP in estimating needs in North Wollo is the lack of concrete population data on the area. Appendix 1 is made up of charts presenting the information which is available and comparing it with JRP and RRC estimates of those in need. Most of this information has not been pulled together in one place before. Estimates for the 1991 population per awraja have been based on Central Statistical Authority figures based on the 1984 census, using weights suggested by the CSA. Because of the security conditions at the time of the 1984 census, population figures for the northern areas of Wollo were only rough estimates. But even if these were poor approximations, there is little chance that the population is as high as local officials in places such as Wag claim it is.

35. As some of the comparisons of needs to total population raise questions about how the estimates of needs were arrived at, either the agencies making the assessments were using different population estimates from those given in the Appendix, or the needs were not compared to available CSA population figures while they were being drawn up.

36. One of the reasons that it is extremely difficult to compare the various estimates of those in need, is that the geographical boundaries for awrajas are different for different agency assessments. JRP uses boundaries of the "old" awrajas when it makes estimates, and avoids using the awraja names by simply listing distributions by distribution centre. Though this avoids the problems of awraja boundaries, it makes it difficult to compare their estimates with those of RRC, who use post-1988

awraja boundaries. (The situation will of course be further complicated when new regional borders now being established are formalized, though it is hoped that more exact population estimates will be made at the same time.) The old boundaries are most commonly used by the people of North Wollo, especially as most of the area was out of government control soon after the new administrative regions were announced in 1988.

37. The absence of credible comparative information on population estimates for the area has meant that visitors to the area have been rather at the mercy of local administration officials who exaggerate figures and claim, for instance, that the population of Wag awraja is 600,000. (Based on the 1984 census estimates, it is currently more likely to be 150,000 or so).

38. Julian Summers, in a report for CAFOD on the Southern Line in late 1991 best sums up the attitude that must be taken to these local estimates when he refers to the problem faced by "characteristic inexactitude with figures which makes gathering of data in the field hazardous. In these circumstances, figures are not used in a scientific way, but instead as a metaphor for the general state of affairs." Other field monitors have also spoken of the total absence of reliable statistics from local officials, and point out how much of it is conflicting, and therefore of little value. Fortunately, there is a sense that the figures for those in need can be regarded as more reliable, since they are drawn up by local committees which determine relief needs on the basis of the individual cases of those in need, not simply as percentages of the population, but they may also be responses to necessarily arbitrary quotas assigned by JRP during the previous Southern Line programme.

39. One conclusion that is clear from the comparisons of needs to estimated population is that for two awrajas where roughly the same crop conditions prevailed, Wag and Lasta, needs are disproportionately higher in comparison to population estimates in Wag. For example, of an awraja population of roughly 150,000 (old boundaries, but excluding Wefla, population 150,000, which is covered by JRP as part of Raya and Kobo), Wag has estimated needs of 115,000, or 77%. In Lasta, the population is around 476,000, while the JRP estimate of those in need is 75,250, or 16%. The proportion of the likely population of Raya and Kobo listed as in need of assistance also appears high (73%), and though we do not question the numbers for the lowland areas, where serious crop failure was experienced last year, highland figures should perhaps be investigated. As the amount of food which the JRP now has available for distributions, is much less than needed for targets, some of this analysis is only academic: a much lower percentage of the total population is reached in actual distributions. The overall total estimate of those in need with which the JRP works has always been rough estimates, and though this was sufficient for the period of the JRP Southern

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Line, when assessment capabilities were limited, more exact information on needs should now be available. Such an assessment might well show that the needs are greater in some areas than now estimated, and JRP should consider the reallocation of some of the amount of food available to areas now receiving relatively less coverage.

40. The estimated total population for the area in which the JRP is working (North Wollo excluding Wadla awraja but including the South Wollo awraja of Ambassel) is approximately 1,715,000. Of this number, the target number to be reached with distributions (see below) is 553,455 (32% of the total population).

H. JRP NORTH WOLLO RELIEF OPERATIONS

41. The target for beneficiaries to be reached in North Wollo by the JRP is 553,455 in four awrajas, Wag, Lasta, Raya and Kobo, and Yedju. The "new" awraja of Wefla (according to the 1988 boundaries - it was previously part of Wag) is included by JRP, as mentioned above, with Raya and Kobo; and part of the needs of the South Wollo awraja of Ambassel are included with Yedju (as this area was under EPRDF control by the last year of the war, and thus was served by the JRP Southern Line).

Distributions

42. Due to the shortages in food stocks, JRP distributions in April were only able to meet 50% of the estimated needs; by May this had slipped to 36% of the target.

43. Summary of distributions:

JRP DISTRIBUTIONS N. WOLLO 1992

	Target	March	April	May (tentative)
Yedju and Ambassel	115,000	117,830	69,192	17,660
Raya and Kobo	248,205	225,410	104,380	91,076
Lasta	75,250	71,532	63,842	32,860
Wag	115,455	77,044	38,000	56,650
Totals	553,455	491,816	275,414	198,246

May figures should be considered as only tentative, as they have yet to be confirmed through cross-checking by LWF. Lasta distributions for May include 10,400 beneficiaries from Lasta who were given rations at the Kobo distribution centre.
The ration used by JRP is 14.4 kg/month.

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44. The pipeline of food for North Wollo was slightly improved for June, and efforts were increasing to put pressure on the appropriate authorities, through the RRC transport coordination committee, to transport the food coming in to Assab during June to Dessie. There is still concern about the amount that will be available for July distributions, as it is not known how quickly a large USAID consignment due that month can be moved out of the port.

45. Looking at the physical aspects of the JRP relief operation in the area, though whatever food is available is reaching the people, we felt that distributions could have been better organized in March. This is possibly a result of problems faced in restarting the operation, but there have also been reported disputes between the member groups of the JRP in the region. This appears to be the result of individuals, not the churches themselves, but has lead to serious disruptions in places such as Alamata. We were surprised that no attempt had been made to focus on the hardest hit areas (such as the lowlands where hardly any harvest had been gathered last year), and there were no priorities set for periods when not enough food was available, except for the priority of moving food to Wag and Lasta ahead of the rain. Even this has not been possible to the extent hoped for, but CRS was expected to provide more trucks to assist in the prepositioning of food in late May and early June.

46. There is concern both inside the JRP and among local officials that because of logistical limits distributions take place only in a few main centres, which mean that people must walk for several days to reach these places. As elsewhere, this has led to beneficiaries selling large parts of their rations, at depressed prices, because of the problems of transporting the food to their home areas. This problem is getting attention, and in the Wag part of the operation, JRP was hoping to move food beyond Sekota. In May, arrangement were being made for two Rubb Hall tents to be moved to Wag, to increase the number of distribution sites.

47. Local representatives of the population (local shengo executive members) frequently questioned why the JRP operation had decreased with the peace, when there are continued needs and access is easier. The position of many of the officials was that the donors should either really commit food, or tell the administration in North Wollo that the food was not going to be sent, so that expectations among the people would not be falsely raised.

48. Logistical and pipeline problems in relief operations affect decisions at the household level among peasants registered as beneficiaries. These decisions are based on whether there is a reasonable expectation that food aid will be delivered or not:

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these include decisions about whether certain members of the household should migrate to find labouring work elsewhere for part or all of the year, (significant when all hands are needed at home, to produce the maximum from the family land), and whether or when to sell animals. Farmers must also decide whether to borrow money at high interest to purchase food. The presence or absence of food aid during this present period also affects whether a family can "afford" to encourage more family members to come back from resettlement areas.

49. Comments have been made by NGOs gathering nutritional status information in North Wollo that the findings have limited value since there is no comparative data, so they do not know what is normal for the area. They suggest that in some areas there may perhaps be chronic malnutrition levels. Their conclusion from the pattern of results in the area surveyed (in this case Wag) is that simply supplying more food will not necessarily improve the nutritional status of the population. The needs are not greatest in Sekota, where the distributions take place.

50. A frequent observation among all the administration and local shengo people we spoke to was that there was very little food available for additional people in need, who were not registered, including those returning from resettlement areas and ex-soldiers, who are described as a significant extra burden on the community.

51. There is some concern within JRP at reports of serious conditions in the awraja of Wadla, where at the present time no distributions are taking place. Needs were identified by RRC in November as 132,500 people expected to need assistance for nine months of the year. The Ethiopian Relief Organization (ERO) reports that significant numbers of people are migrating out of the awraja, though this is probably part of the traditional movement of labour from the area.

52. In Wag, we were concerned about the amount of rations that were sold after distributions took place in Sekota, much of it being taken out of the area in trucks by merchants coming from as far away as Dessie and Mekelle. This is due mostly to the great distance many beneficiaries must walk to Sekota. The fact that many people are selling all of their ration, not keeping even a part of it, is evidence that food is available for sale in sufficient amounts in their home areas, at least for those with some resources. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that another reason much of the relief food is going into the market may be because of overestimates of needs. For those who are in serious need of assistance, the April and May distributions are very important, as after that time, during the long rainy season, people cannot walk from their homes. People who had migrated out of the area to find work were expected to return by May, to prepare their land before the rain. In some communities people

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returning from resettlement areas and other places appear to qualify for food aid assistance, regardless of need, something which might also explain part of the amount of relief food going into the market. As in several areas, the EPRDF administrator for the awraja claimed that the figure of 115,000 registered beneficiaries does not reflect the real needs of the area, and is only a result of the quota system.

53. In Korem (in Wefla awraja), no distributions were made to most of the beneficiaries between November and late March when JRP restarted distributions. As elsewhere, there was concern that the JRP quota was too low to cover current needs, let alone the extra people coming back to the area. (This must be seen in the context of claims from the same officials that "only one-quarter of the needs were covered by the JRP quota", when in fact the population estimate for the area is 130,000, and the estimated needs are already 40% of this, at 53,000. Actual distributions in number of beneficiaries were March 48,800 and April 33,474.)

54. In the town of Alamata, the awraja capital of Raya and Kobo, the local shengo chairman told us that he was nervous about walking down the main street of the town, there were so many people complaining about the non-arrival of promised, and urgently needed, food rations. (By May, the RRC and ERO representatives had found it expedient to not be based in this town). In addition to the 65,000 people registered, the shengo officials have reported an additional 29,000 in need to RRC. Although a recent SCF nutritional survey shows no significant change in the nutritional status of the children in Raya and Kobo from previous months, with the average weight for length remaining at 93.9%, there were widespread reports in the area of no food supplies at the household level, a reflection of last year's bad crops. The need for relief food is thus very urgent. Little Belg planted crops were expected, because of the failure of the recent rains. The Kobo area appeared harder hit that the area closer to Alamata, where there were some irrigated crops harvested last year. Though there is some dependence on cattle in the area, especially in drought years when animals are sold in higher quantities, SCF UK reported that there are worries about a Rinderpest epidemic.

55. In Lasta, there had also been a long break of three months between distributions. The local shengo executive in Lalibela reported that distributions had also been spotty last year, with several breaks, some due to poor road conditions during the long rains. The estimated number in need, as described above, was a relatively low percentage of the population, and in view of poor crops in the area last year reported by the WFP/FAO assessment team, there may be significant numbers of people in need who are not registered. The Meher harvest had been poor for a range of reasons, drought in some places, but also, as the SCF UK

nutrition survey report puts it, excess rainfall and other adverse weather conditions in other parts of the awraja, as well as damage by a range of pests. Also according to the SCF UK report, the condition of the livestock was a cause for concern, with 65% of the cattle in the highland emaciated due to inadequate forage. While no rations had been arriving people had been selling animals to buy food, but the shengo executive claimed that "now the animals are finished". Though an overstatement, this would fit with our sense that there were very few animals in the area. People were reported as migrating for labour, again a traditional coping mechanism in bad years for the local population. MSF France report that they were told during their nutritional survey that household stocks were low to non-existent, especially in lowland areas. But it was also clear that in many area, families had stocks of food in underground storage, and barley from the year before last (when there was a very good harvest) was thus still available.

56. For Ambassel awraja, the SCF UK nutritional status for the recent period showed a satisfactory level. Because the Meher crops last year were generally satisfactory, conditions are not as serious in this awraja as further north. There is a possibility that distributions in this area are not as justified as in other JRP areas, and thus if there are shortages of stocks, this area, which is relatively easier of access, should perhaps not have the priority of Kobo or Wag and Lasta. Details on relief distributions in Yedju were not collected.

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IV. CROP CONDITIONS

1. The Belg rains of February-April normally play a much more significant role in North Wollo than in most of Tigray, and thus the discussion below focusses on North Wollo. The early period of the rains is covered in the EPPG Situation Report for Wollo, March 1992. Much of the following information is based on FAO reports.

A. NORTH WOLLO

2. The Belg rain in North Wollo started, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, in January, a month earlier than usual, but by mid-February stopped for over a month. Even for the early period, the normal pattern of rain in the most northern part of the region was reversed, with very little rain in the highlands, and deceptively promising rain in the lowlands. The rains did not recommence in significant amounts in the lowlands. The rain began again in only some of the highland areas of North Wollo in late March. By the latter part of April and early May, conditions remained dry in the north, though they were more normal further south in Wollo. The long dry spell in February and March had a very negative impact on Belg crops, even where rain fell

again later. The later rains, where they fell, will have favoured the planting of long cycle Meher crops such as maize and sorghum. By the end of Belg rainy season the picture was generally very poor in areas where farmers traditionally try to grow Belg crops in North Wollo. A limited area of southern Tigray received Belg rain, but a less extensive area was planted than last year. Late Belg rain in other areas of Tigray made it possible for ploughing to begin in preparation for the Meher planting.

3. A major factor in the crop conditions at the end of the Belg rains was whether fields had been planted early or late. Therefore the impact of the continuing lack of enough plough oxen in the whole area is very evident: farmers who planted early were able to benefit from later rain for critical moisture needed during flowering, especially in soils of good moisture reserve; farmers who had to wait to borrow oxen when others had finished with them, had crops which were still very undeveloped by the time of the later rain, and thus did not benefit as much from the same rain. Crops planted late, in March, were most vulnerable. These differences in plant growth were very visible in the Korem area. FAO confirms that this pattern held true for most early planted highland areas in Raya and Kobo, but reports that all the same there was a profound deviation from normal rain patterns. Nearly all the highlands of traditional Belg cropping areas experienced severe moisture stress in late January and during February. In general, the lowlands of Kobo to Alamata had more rain than the highlands, but experienced severe moisture stress after February.

4. The contrasts are so great, even in small areas, that it is difficult to make generalized statements about conditions in North Wollo.

Details per awraja:

5. In the North Wollo interior of Wag and Lasta very little rain fell, but this is the usual pattern. Lack of rain in the highlands also affected the irrigated crops, mostly maize, of the lowland area around Alamata, which were showing signs of water stress by April. Where ears of maize had developed, these appeared to be small, and thus the crop, which was anyway quite limited in area, was not expected to be very significant.

6. Other information from the lowlands of Alamata and Kobo was that the Belg rain had been good at the beginning, in January, when farmers "rushed to plant". Then in the middle of the season, the rain stopped, and plant growth was "choked", the term used by the people of the area to describe the effect of the long period of an absence of rain. There was more rain at the beginning of April, but it was too late to reverse the situation, and the crops were ploughed under, or collected as cattle fodder.

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7. In the Lake Ashange area, between Korem and the Tigray border, maize was planted in early April following localized rainfall at the north end of the lake. The southern part of the lake was still very dry at that time.

8. To the west of Korem in Wefla awraja, where the long dry spell had badly affected crops that had been planted, it was clear by early April that any further rain would be too late, and it did not look as though there would be much Belg crop. Farmers were preparing their fields for planting short cycle crops of wheat and barley in June. There were signs of planting in a few areas that had received recent rain, and long cycle crops of either maize or sorghum were 3-5 cm high. In contrast to the last Belg, when a large area planted, and a good harvest was gathered, this year only a small area was planted. Visitors to the area in May reported that some areas appeared to be doing relatively well. The area to the south of Korem presented a very mixed picture in early April, with some fields of crops, mostly barley or wheat, that were tall and had developed seed heads. Other fields held crops that were short and had not matured, and some fields appeared to have been only recently planted.

9. Very little area in Lasta was under Belg cultivation, which is limited to the easternmost part of the awraja. Last year a greater area had been planted during the Belg.

10. Around Woldiya in Yedju awraja in early April crops were at the critical flowering point in highland areas and needed rain. Some had fallen at the beginning of April, but had been very uneven, and a lot of variation in conditions throughout the area was expected. The intensely cultivated areas under irrigation west of Woldiya were doing well, with maize already high around the houses in early April. Higher into the colder dega, fields were not yet planted or even ploughed, and we were told that the farmers needed rain to begin ploughing. Parts of this area are under a different cropping year, and a very long cycle barley is planted because of the altitude. Further west along the Chinese highway in still at a very high altitude, in the parts of Wadla and Lasta visible from the road, barley was at a young stage in early April. Most of the fields in this area were ploughed, except in the frequent rougher areas where the countryside is very bare. Further west still, over the border into Gondar, the countryside provided a strong contrast to most parts of Wag and Lasta, as in this area there were large stacks of straw from last year's harvest in every compound, often three or four per compound. In other parts of North Wollo there are household stocks of straw even in places where there were not good harvests last year, as the stalks of the failed crops at least grew to a good height before the rain ended. In the North Wollo lowlands there were good supplies of sorghum and maize stalks around Alamata, crop residue which is used for fodder, and plays a role at this time as a cash crop.

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11. No first hand information on the crop situation south of Woldiya in early April was collected. From talks in Woldiya, it appeared that in the area rain had fallen for the first time in a month for a few days in early April, but that it had been very uneven. Barley and wheat was starting to flower and develop seed heads. The moisture which was retained during the very dry period by the heavy cloud cover in the Dessie and other areas may have helped some crops survive until this recent rain. The FAO update stated that around Wochale and in the valley of Hayk, where the soil is of a high water-retention capacity, crops looked satisfactory in May.

B. TIGRAY

12. Authorities in the Ministry of Agriculture in Mekelle confirmed the general assessment of last November: the only good areas of crops were in the highlands of Axum, Temben, and Raya Azebo. Surplus crops were available from Wolkait awraja, near the border with Sudan, in the Humera area. These were part of what REST hoped purchase for distributions near-by. As in North Wollo, a significant and very visible result of last year's harvest in some parts of the region, such as central areas of Kilte Awlalo, is the piles of straw beside houses. As described in the November Situation Report, many farmers reported extremely poor harvests of cereal, because of undeveloped seed heads, but were pleased that at least they had tall stalks as fodder for their animals. In contrast, in parts of Agame there was little straw outside huts, and in places aloe roots, used as an alternate source of fodder, were dug up along the road. Cactus is also used as fodder in this area.

13. The only area of Tigray where Belg crops are planted, the Raya and Azebo highlands, showed a mixed picture in early April. By late May this was confirmed by FAO reports from the area which indicated that early planted crops in soils of good moisture reserve were likely to do well, while late planted crops were more vulnerable. In April, those crops which had reached flowering stage, mostly barley, were usually very short, or stunted. Since other fields were not doing even as well as these, the result was a great deal of difference within small areas close together. Compared to the area being harvested when we drove through the area last June and July, a much smaller percentage of the fields had been planted this year.

14. The Mahoni lowlands to the east of Maichew lie in an area of a distinct micro-climate. This area had received much more rain than the Alamata area nearby, in the continuation of the lowland to the south, and had been extensively planted by early March (maize planted in January/February, was a metre high by early March) but there was still concern that unless the rains of early April continued, the extensively planted maize crop in the area

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would fail. At that time, crops had not matured, there were no seed heads and plant growth was "choked". Reports in May indicated that there was still concern whether the crops had received enough extra moisture from the rain that had fallen in the interval, and visitors to the area were pessimistic.

15. South of Maichew, in the highlands neighbouring on the Raya and Kobo highlands of North Wollo, the general feeling appeared to be that even if more rain came, there would be very short stalks, and not much seed head development. Short stalks will affect the amount of straw that can be expected at the time of harvesting.

16. In the rest of Tigray, a bit of Belg rain in late March meant that the ground was softened and farmers in Agame and in other areas were able to start ploughing for the Meher. The rain had been negligible until this point, and what fell at this time was not widespread. In a very few places in Agame, farmers had used the small quantity of Belg rain to plant barley in mid March. The rain that fell was also important for the growth of even small amounts of grass, since this is assists in strengthening oxen in preparation for the ploughing. The oxen appeared to be still in good shape, a result of the straw available from last year, since in the parts of Agame we visited there is no grazing land whatsoever. In general, through the central area, there was a mixed picture concerning how much ploughing was as yet going on in early April. Factors which affected this were not just rain, but availability of oxen, and the pull of other income possibilities, as there was an increased number of jobs for daily labourers in the towns. In areas of Enderta west of Mekelle not much ploughing going on by even early April. The part of Tigray west of Adigrat not visited during the March/April field visit, so we have no information on this area.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The resilience and resourcefulness of the peasants in the countryside in the middle of a food deficit period must not be forgotten. The importance of the relief operation in Tigray and North Wollo is not simply in providing food. As described by Alex de Waal in his "Famine Survival Strategies in Wollo, Tigray and Eritrea, a review of the Literature" (for Oxfam, December 1990):

> As well as providing direct assistance, relief programmes assist many survival strategies. By bringing down the price of food, the relative returns to selling animals and working for money are increased. Fewer animals need be sold to meet consumption needs, and herders and labourers may be able to spend money on other items, thereby boosting the economy. Relief food becomes a tradable commodity, assisting those

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> engaged in petty trade...Relief food reduces the need for farmers to borrow. (p.25)

2. Relief food into these areas has not been reliable enough in the past for people to depend on it to the exclusion of other careful resource management. The unreliability of regular relief food is continuing in spite of conditions following the end of the war which should have eased the logistical constraints. As de Waal concludes,

> Relief is most effective when it can be used by rural people as part of their survival strategies. If the supply is uncertain, or it requires constant attendance at a...distribution point, or the recipient is obliged to consume it all and prevented from selling or storing some, it will be less effective. (p.25)

Because of a poor food pipeline, the donors have missed a chance to assist the affected population with regular relief assistance that could have provided a good basis for rehabilitation.

3. For an effective relief operation, donors must make commitments to turn pledges into firm consignments with specific arrival dates. Even if shipments must be delayed until later in the year, borrowing among relief agencies to keep distributions going depends on firm shipping dates for future repayments.

4. Those agencies and coordinating groups involved in the organization of the current relief programme share responsibility with the donors in not having made provisions for food to be in the pipeline at the right time. Pressure is needed on donors far in advance of the empty periods in the pipeline.

5. A well organized Food Security Reserve would have avoided some of the problems faced by the relief operations this year. There is full agreement that this is best preventative step that can be taken, but there is a need for commitment to the Reserve in the form of food.

6. Internal administrative problems have played a role in making the current relief operations, especially in North Wollo, less effective than they could have been. These problems must be recognized before they can be avoided in future relief operations in the area. Better coordination is needed.

7. More attention is needed to the differences between areas receiving relief assistance, and ways found to give priority to the most vulnerable areas, especially when food relief supplies are limited. JRP should be encouraged to increase its monitoring capacity in North Wollo, and through this monitoring be able to ensure there is information available on which to assign priority areas.

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APPENDIX 1 - STATISTICS

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NO.1 TIGRAY - POPULATION FIGURES COMPARED TO ESTIMATED RELIEF NEEDS 1992 (FOR FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR)

17 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

Needs: R = REST
C = Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat/JRP

Population figures - TPLF estimates given in "Independent Crop Assessment Mission, Eritrea and Tigray, November/December 1990", by John Wilding and Trish Silkin for the CDR Resource Group, and in chart giving Population and Livestock Distribution in Tigray, Annex III, UN/EPPG Tigray Situation Report for February 1992.
CSA - Central Statistical Authority

AWRAJA	TPLF ESTIMATE 1990	CSA c.1989/90	TARGET NEEDS AS OF MAR 1992	NEEDS AS % OF TPLF EST POP
ADWA	1,120,000	560,000	R 144,564	13%
AGAME	460,000	390,000	R 217,259	47%
AXUM	360,000	350,000	R 44,025	12%
ENDERTA	1,040,000	400,000	C 214,151	21%
KILTE AWLALO	360,000	240,000	C 266,802	74%
RAYA	380,000	150,000	C 200,335	53%
SHIRE	420,000	320,000	R 170,229	41%
TEMBIEN	280,000	320,000	R 88,845	32%
TSELEMTI-SEMIEN	200,000		?	
WOLKAIT	200,000		R 8,000	4%
TOTAL	4,820,000	2,730,000(1)	R 672,922 C 681,288 R&C 1,354,210	28%

NOTE: (1) CSA total for Tigray does not include Wolkait and Tselemti-Semien, which would bring their figure for total population of Tigray to 3,130,000. Several sources, including Africa Watch, agree with TPLF's assertion that the Ethiopian government deliberately underestimated the population of Tigray in the past.

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NO.2 TIGRAY - POPULATION FIGURES COMPARED TO ESTIMATED RELIEF NEEDS FOR REMAINDER OF 1992 (JULY-DECEMBER, TENTATIVE)

15 June 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

Needs: R = REST (planning figures for last six months of the year)
C = Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat/JRP

Population figures - TPLF estimates given in "Independent Crop Assessment Mission, Eritrea and Tigray, November/December 1990", by John Wilding and Trish Silkin for the CDR Resource Group, and in chart giving Population and Livestock Distribution in Tigray, Annex III, UN/EPPG Tigray Situation Report for February 1992.
CSA - Central Statistical Authority

AWRAJA	TPLF ESTIMATE 1990	CSA	TARGET NEEDS AS OF JUL 1992	NEEDS AS % OF TPLF EST POP
ADWA	1,120,000	560,000	R 177,200	16%
AGAME	460,000	390,000	R 232,227	50%
AXUM	360,000	350,000	R 58,784	16%
ENDERTA	1,040,000	400,000	C 214,151	21%
KILTE AWLALO	360,000	240,000	C 266,802	74%
RAYA	380,000	150,000	C 200,335	53%
SHIRE	420,000	320,000	R 220,799	53%
TEMBIEN	280,000	320,000	R 106,384	38%
TSELEMTI-SEMIEN	200,000		?	
WOLKAIT	200,000		R 10,000	5%
TOTAL	4,820,000	2,730,000(1)	R 805,394 C 681,288 R&C 1,486,682	31%

NOTE: (1) See note ref CSA cf TPLF estimated population with previous chart

ECS adjusted plans in June (still under discussion as of mid-June):
to include Agame, 250,000, and decreased figures elsewhere - Enderta, 198,000; Kilte Awlalo 175,000; Raya 169,500. Total 792,500.

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NO.3 TIGRAY - ESTIMATED NEEDS COMPARED TO DISTRIBUTIONS 1992

12 June 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

R - REST C - Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat/JRP

In number of beneficiaries.

WOREDA	NEEDS AS OF MAR.	DISTRIBUTIONS 1992 JAN	FEB	MARCH
ADWA	R 144,564	R 144,564	R 144,564	R 145,564
AGAME	R 217,259	R nil C 152,836	R 217,259 C 984	R 217,259 C (1)
ALAM	R 44,025	R 44,025	R 44,025	R 54,736
ENDERTA	C 214,151	C 62,225	C 133,294	C 180,897
KILTE AWLALO	C 266,802	R nil C 70,812	R 156,128 C 94,873	C 183,432
RAYA	C 200,335	R 93,334 C nil	R nil C nil	C 95,315
SHIRE	R 170,229	R 170,229	R 170,229	R 170,229
TEMBIEN	R 88,845	R 88,845	R 88,845	R 88,845*
TSELEMTI-SEMIEN	?			
WOLKAIT	R 8,000	R 8,000	R 8,000	R 8,000
SUB-TOTALS	R 672,922 C 681,288	R 548,997 C 285,873	R 829,050 C 229,151	R 684,633 C 459,644
TOTAL	1,354,210	834,870	1,058,201	1,144,277
%	100%	61%	78%	84%
PLUS DISPLACED	[R 49,157]	R 129,471 **		
	REST TOTAL FOR JAN	R 678,468		

* Tembien - some of listed March distributions took place in April

** 49,157 displaced dispersed from the Adigrat and Mekelle camps received three months supply each. ECS/JRP also distributed to displaced: January 5,826 and February 9,205.

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NO.4 TIGRAY - CURRENT 1992 DISTRIBUTIONS COMPARED TO 1991

17 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG
revised 12 June 1992

In number of beneficiaries:

MONTHS	1991 BENEFICIARIES	1992 BENEFICIARIES
JANUARY	1,315,057	834,870*
FEBRUARY	1,389,350	1,058,201
MARCH	1,288,386	1,144,277
APRIL	644,430	1,229,374
MAY	1,365,365	
JUNE	1,708,865	
JULY	1,915,778	
AUGUST	1,492,286	
SEPTEMBER	1,278,727	
OCTOBER	1,251,791	
NOVEMBER	675,300**	
DECEMBER	851,800**	
TOTAL (approx)	15,177,135 rations	
monthly average	1,264,760	

revision based on ECS figures from CRS in early June

NOTES:
* Drought affected population only. In addition, 49,157 displaced received rations for three months (129,471 rations), from REST. ECS also distributed to 5,826 displaced in January and 9,205 displaced in February (not in totals)

** Estimate are approximations based on total tonnage distributed (Nov - REST 5,643 MT, JRP 4,944 MT rev; Dec - REST 8,000 MT approx, JRP 5,489 MT rev). Actual beneficiaries may have been higher. Final REST report for 1991 under preparation.

Target for 1991: REST: unknown
JRP: 944,000 beneficiaries (by July adjusted to 800,000)

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NO.5 NORTH WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION PER OLD AND NEW AWRAJAS

Old awrajas - those existing before administrative changes of 1988. Used by JRP.

New awrajas - those created when new administrative system set up in 1988, when Wollo divided into North and South Wollo.

Population figures for 1991 are EPPG estimates, calculated using 1984 census figures and CSA weights (1984 estimates multiplied by 1.147 for 1989 rural population estimates, 1989 figures multiplied by 1.057). To be considered very tentative estimates.

27 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

	Estimated population		Estimated needs (as of March 1992)	
	1991 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 pop. (new awraja boundaries)	RRC using new awrajas	JRP using old awrajas
RAYA AND KOBO AND WEFLA:				
TOTAL:	T[340,000]			
Raya and Kobo (old)	210,000			
Raya and Kobo (new)		300,000	202,890	
Raya and Kobo (old) + Wefla	T[340,000]			248,205 (includes Wefla)
Wefla - old	130,000			
YEJU AND AMBASSEL:				
TOTAL	T [750,000]	T[682,000]	T[180,650]	T[115,000]
Yeju (old)	315,000			
Yeju (new)		366,000	99,500	
Yeju (old) + Ambassel (old)	[750,000]			115,000
Ambassel (old)	435,000			
Ambassel (new)		316,000	81,150	

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NO.5 N. WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION PER OLD AND NEW AWRAJAS, PAGE 2

	Estimated population		Estimated needs (as of March 1992)	
	1991 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 pop. (new awraja boundaries)	RRC using new awrajas	JRP using old awrajas
WAG:				
Wag (old)	280,000			
Wag (old) without Wefla	[150,000]			115,000
"Wag" (new) (3 awrajas)		T[260,400]	T[264,900]	
break down:				
Wefla	[130,000]	125,400	60,000	JRP distributions include Wefla under Raya and Kobo
Wag (Sekota)	[82,000]	73,700	184,900	
Dehana	[68,000]	61,300	20,000	
LASTA AND WADLA TOTAL:	T[761,000]	T[600,200]	T[217,500]	
Lasta (old)	476,000			75,250
Wadla (old)	285,000			no relief op.
New awrajas break down:				
Lasta (new)		180,000	40,000	
Meket and Wadla (new)		264,200	132,500	
Delanta and Dawent (new)		156,000	45,000	

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NO.5 N. WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION PER OLD AND NEW AWRAJAS, PAGE 3

	Estimated population		Estimated needs (as of March 1992)	
	1991 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 pop. (new awraja boundaries)	RRC using new awrajas	JRP using old awrajas
TOTALS				
NORTH WOLLO:	1,565,000	1,526,000	784,790 (1)	
plus				
Ambassel (SOUTH WOLLO)	435,000	316,000	81,150	
GRAND TOTAL	2,000,000	1,842,000	T[865,940]	553,455 (2)
To compare with coverage in JRP operational area:				
Total N. Wollo and Ambassel minus Wadla	[1,715,000]			553,455

Notes:

For old awrajas, EPPG estimates for 1991 are based on the original 1984 figures as given in RRC/EPPG Vulnerability Profile of Wollo, 1986 (CSA figures for 1984, subtracting official numbers of people resettled 1984-85). For the new awrajas, the figures are based on population per awraja as given in CSA estimates for 1989 (from Statistical Bulletin 72) which in turn are based on the 1984 census. The CSA weights for estimating the 1991 population are given on p. ii of CSA Statistical Bulletin 72. (Population Estimated of Autonomous and Administrative Regions, Awrajas and Towns, 1989)

(1) RRC adds 372 beneficiaries of category "families of ex-soldiers" to bring RRC total for North Wollo to 785,162 in need.

(2) JRP does not include Wadla awraja as part of its operational area (1991 EPPG estimated population for old awraja boundaries of Wadla is 285,000).

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NO.6 NORTH WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION COMPARED TO JRP ESTIMATED NEEDS FOR 1992 (WITH PERCENTAGES) 27 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

Population figures for 1991 are EPPG estimates, calculated using 1984 census figures and CSA weights (1984 estimates multiplied by 1.147 for 1989 rural population estimates, 1989 figures multiplied by 1.057). To be considered very tentative estimates.

AWRAJA	1991 EST. POPULATION calculated using CSA 1984 Old Awrajas	1991 ESTIMATE calculated using CSA New Awrajas 1989	OTHER ESTIMATES	NEEDS (JRP)	% compared to each
"RAYA AND KOBO"	[340,000](A)	[425,000](2)	"300,000"(1)	248,205	Old 73% New 58% "83%"
Raya Kobo	210,000	300,000			
Wefla	[130,000]	[125,000]			
YEDJU and AMBASSEL	315,000 435,000	366,000 316,000			
sub-total	[750,000]	[682,000]		115,000(6)	Old 15% New 17%
"WAG"	[150,000](A) (minus Wefla)	[135,000](3) (minus Wefla)	"450,000"(1) "700,000"(1)	115,000(4)	Old 77% New 85% "33%" "16%"
LASTA and WADLA	[761,000]	[600,200]			
Lasta	476,000	180,000(5)		75,250	Old 16%
Wadla	[285,000]				New 42%
TOTALS	2,000,000	1,842,000			
Total N.Wollo and Ambassel minus Wadla	[1,715,000]	[1,422,000]		553,455	Old 32% New 39

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NO.6 NORTH WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION COMPARED TO JRP ESTIMATED NEEDS FOR 1992 (WITH PERCENTAGES), PAGE 2

NOTES:

For old awrajas, EPPG estimates for 1991 are based on the original 1984 figures as given in RRC/EPPG Vulnerability Profile of Wollo, 1986 (CSA census figures for 1984, subtracting official numbers of people resettled 1984-85). For the new awrajas, the figures are based on population per awraja as given in CSA estimates for 1989 (from Statistical Bulletin 72) which in turn are based on the 1984 census. The CSA weights for estimating the 1991 population are given on p. ii of CSA Statistical Bulletin 72. (Population Estimated of Autonomous and Administrative Regions, Awrajas and Towns, 1989)

(A) To compare with "new" awrajas: old awraja of Wag includes Wefla, which should be added to old Raya and Kobo figures for comparison. (JRP includes Wefla as part of "Raya and Kobo" distributions.)

(1) Local estimates:
Raya and Kobo - source not noted
Wag figures from local authorities (EPRDF adminstrator in October told us "450,000", though estimates at the time from other local authorities were up to "600,000"; in March a new EPRDF administrator told us "more than 700,000" and the local council [shengo] claimed Wag population was "800,000")

(2) Raya and Kobo figures added to Wefla (artificial total, thus not given in other chart showing comparison of population figures with both JRP and RRC estimates of need)

(3) Wag (Sekota) plus Dahana

(4) "old Wag" made up of 1988 awrajas of "Wag" (Sekota) and Dehana, but with different eastern boundary, approx. 40 km from Korem, (probably again due to spheres of control during the war.)

(5) Lasta - to compare present area encompased by old boundaries of Lasta, new estimate of population would include part of the population of the new Meket and Wadla awraja after 1988.

(6) JRP estimated needs for Yeju includes Wochale, Worgeza, Mersa, Woldiya and Doro Giber. (Some not actually in N. Wollo - Wochale and Worgeza are in Ambassel, but in areas that were under EPRDF control during the latter part of the war, thus were served by the JRP Southern Line. Thus population estimate, for comparison, includes population of Ambassel, and area listed here as "Yeju and Ambassel".)

COMMENTS: Population figures were considered to be very rough estimates even at the time of the 1984 census.

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NO.7 NORTH WOLLO - JRP DISTRIBUTIONS COMPARED TO ESTIMATED NEEDS 1992, BY DISTRIBUTION POINT

25 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

Distribution and target figures are from JRP March and April statistics

		DISTRIBUTIONS 1992			
AWRAJA	NEEDS	JAN	FEB	MARCH	APRIL
YEDJU (AND AMBASSEL)	[115,000](1)				
Dorogiber & Hara	28,800	--	--	22,200	15,990
Woldiya	35,800	--	--	38,630	25,283
Mersa	31,600	--	--	38,200	18,800
Wurgessa	9,800	--	--	9,800	5,212
Wuchale	9,000	--	--	9,000	3,907
subtotal	115,000			117,830	69,192
RAYA AND KOBO	[248,205](2)				
Kobo 1	57,725	--	--		21,650
Kobo 2	24,750				13,395
Kobo total		--	--	69,649	
Korem	53,000	--	--	48,800	33,474
Alamata	60,000	--	--	56,889	12,856
Robit	29,980	--	--	50,072	23,005
Gobiye	22,750				
subtotal	248,205			225,410	104,380
LASTA	[75,250]	--	--		
Lalibela	32,700	--	--	29,000	32,700
Estayesh	21,250				
Kulmesk	16,550	--	--	16,550	16,550
Felakit	4,750*	--	--	25,982	14,592
subtotal	75,250			71,532	63,842

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NO.7 NORTH WOLLO - JRP DISTRIBUTIONS COMPARED TO NEEDS 1992, PAGE 2

		DISTRIBUTIONS 1992			
AWRAJA	NEEDS	JAN	FEB	MARCH	APRIL
WAG	[115,000](3)				
Sekota	60,000	--	--	77,044	38,000
Kozeba	40,000	--	--	--	--
Hamusit	15,000	--	--	--	--
subtotal	115,000			77,044	38,000
TOTAL	553,455			491,816	275,414
% of target	100%			89%	50%

NOTES

(1) includes Wochale, Worgeza, Mersa, Woldiya and Doro Giber. (Some not actually in N. Wollo - Wochale and Worgeza are in Ambassel, South Wollo, but in areas that were under EPRDF control during the latter part of the war, thus were served by the JRP Southern Line.

(2) Robit, Kobo, Alamata and Korem (Korem by 1988 awraja boundaries is in Wefla awraja)

(3) "old Wag" made up of 1988 awrajas of "Wag" (Sekota) and Dehana, but with different eastern boundary, approx 40 km from Korem, (probably again due to spheres of control during the war.)

* Felakit (target 4,750) is on the edge of Lasta and Wadla, on the Chinese Road near the border with Gondar; higher than planned distribution figures perhaps reflect concern of JRP and local authorities for high unmet needs in Wadla, or ease of access leading to serving other registered Lasta population from this distribution point.

CCRDA

NO.8 NORTH WOLLO - 1991 ESTIMATED POPULATION COMPARED TO JRP ESTIMATED NEEDS (WITH PERCENTAGES) AND 1992 DISTRIBUTIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF ESTIMATED 1991 POPULATION

Population figures for 1991 are EPPG estimates, calculated using 1984 census figures and CSA weights (1984 estimates multiplied by 1.147 for 1989 rural population estimates, 1989 figures multiplied by 1.057). To be considered very tentative estimates. (See p. ii, CSA Statistical Bulletin 72. Population Estimated of Autonomous and Administrative Regions, Awrajas and Towns, 1989)

CSA - Central Statistical Authority

Estimated needs based on information from JRP (EECMY/LWF)

15 June 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

AWRAJA	1991 EST. POPULATION (EPPG) Old Awrajas	NEEDS (JRP)	% compared to old awrajas population	1992 DISTRIBUTIONS Mar	as % of 1991 pop.	Apr	as % of 1991 pop.
"RAYA AND KOBO" includes Wefla	[340,000]	248,205	73%	225,410	66%	104,380	31%
YEDJU and AMBASSEL	315,000 435,000						
sub-total	[750,000]	115,000	15%	117,830	16%	69,192	9%
"WAG"	[150,000] (minus Wefla)	115,000	77%	77,044	51%	38,000	25%
LASTA and WADLA	[761,000]						
Lasta	476,000	75,250	16%	71,532	15%	63,842	13%
Wadla	[285,000]						
TOTALS	2,000,000						
Total N.Wollo and Ambassel minus Wadla	[1,715,000]	553,455	32%	491,816	29%	275,414	16%

CCRDA

NO.9 NORTH WOLLO - SUMMARY OF POPULATION DIFFERENCES - 1984, 1989, 1991

As the 1991 EPPG estimates do not appear in published form, the following chart lists all the published information on which the estimates are based.

Old awrajas - those existing before administrative changes of 1988. Used by JRP. Population figures from CSA census of 1984. (1)

New awrajas - those created when new administrative system was set up in 1988, when Wollo was divided into North and South Wollo. Populations per awraja are CSA estimates for 1989 (from Statistical Bulletin 72) based on 1984 census.

Population figures for 1991 are EPPG estimates, calculated using 1984 census figures and CSA weights (1984 estimates multiplied by 1.147 for 1989 rural population estimates, 1989 figures multiplied by 1.057). To be considered very tentative estimates. (See p. ii, CSA Statistical Bulletin 72.)

CSA - Central Statistical Authority 5 June 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

	Estimated population			
	1984 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG old awrajas	CSA 1989 est. (new awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG new awrajas
RAYA AND KOBO AND WEFLA:				
Raya and Kobo (old)	173,650	210,000		
Raya and Kobo (new)			283,055	300,000
Raya and Kobo (old) + Wefla	T[280,338]	[340,000]		
Wefla - old	106,688	130,000		
YEJU AND AMBASSEL:				
TOTAL	T [618,385]	[682,000]	T[645,454]	[682,000]
Yeju (old)	259,474	315,000		
Yeju (new)			346,505	366,000
Yeju (old) + Ambassel (old)	[618,385]	[750,000]		
Ambassel (old)	358,911	435,000		
Ambassel (new)			298,949	316,000

CCRDA

NO.9 N. WOLLO - SUMMARY OF POPULATION DIFFERENCES - 1984, 1989, 1991, PAGE 2

WAG:				
Wag (old)	230,373	280,000		
Wag (old) without Wefla	[123,685]	[150,000]		
"Wag" (new) (3 awrajas)			T[246,374]	[260,400]
break down:				
Wefla	[106,688]	[130,000]	118,654	125,400
Wag (Sekota)	[67,714]		69,708	73,700
Dehana	[55,971]		58,012	61,300
LASTA AND WADLA TOTAL:	T[627,387]	[761,000]	T[567,864]	[600,200]
Lasta (old)	392,269	476,000		
Wadla (old)	235,118	285,000		
New awrajas break down:				
Lasta (new)			170,089	180,000
Meket and Wadla (new)			250,012	264,200
Delanta and Dawent (new)			147,763	156,000
TOTALS				
NORTH WOLLO:	1,290,884	1,565,000	1,443,798	1,526,000
plus				
Ambassel (SOUTH WOLLO)	358,911	435,000	298,949	316,000
GRAND TOTAL	1,649,795	2,000,000	1,742,747	1,842,000
JRP operational area:				
Total N. Wollo and Ambassel minus Wadla	[1,414,677]	[1,715,000]		

NOTES
(1) from RRC/EPPG Vulnerability Profile of Wollo, 1986 (CSA figures for 1984, subtracting official numbers of people resettled 1984-85)
[ ] indicates figures in artificial geographical groupings to be able to compare RRC and JRP figures: either numbers broken down by old woredas or new awrajas, or T[ ] as totals for comparison.
COMMENT: Population figures were considered to be very rough estimates even at the time of the 1984 census.

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CRDA

REST. Various "Updates" available through the REST Information Office, Addis Ababa or REST Mekelle. Addis Ababa telephone 51 45 23 or 51 43 78

TTAC. Several useful documents are available through the TTAC (Tigray Transport and Agricultural Consortium), whose offices are in the same building as REST in Addis Ababa. Telephone 51 42 21.

UN/EPPG Situation Report for Tigray and North Wollo, July 1991. Written by Deborah Hicks. [Includes a description of the general agricultural development philosophy of TPLF and REST, and the structure of Tigrean society.] Addis Ababa.

UN/EPPG Situation Report for Tigray and North Wollo, November 1991. Written by Deborah Hicks. [Part I: current crop and livestock conditions, and relief operations; Part II: Economic situation and changing relations between regional authorities and central ministries.] Addis Ababa.

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Ministry of Health, Lalibela

EPRDF Administrators in Sekota, Lalibela, and Woldiya

EWWCA and WASSA in Sekota

MSF France, Medecins Sans Frontieres France, Sekota and Lalibela

Missionaries of Charity, Alamata

SOUTH WOLLO

SCF UK, Dessie

RRC Branch Head, Dessie

JRP, Dessie

Ministry of Agriculture, Dessie

ADDIS ABABA

FAO, UN Food and Agricultural Organization

WFP, UN World Food Programme

LWF/JRP, Lutheran World Federation/Joint Relief Partnership

CRS, Catholic Relief Services

GTZ, German Technical Assistance

REST, Relief Society of Tigray
Ato Teklewoini Assefa, Head
Ms Fiona Meagan, Information Officer

ERO, Ethiopian Relief Organization

MSF France, Medecins Sans Frontieres, France

SCF/UK, Save the Children Fund, U.K.


OXFAM

UNDP, United Nations Development Program

Various donors - USAID, EEC, SIDA, Canadian Embassy, and others

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TIGRAY
HADEGTI
SEYEMTI ADIABO
LAY ADIABO
SHIRE
LAY KERARO
TACH KERARO
TSIMBELA
ASGEDI
ZANA
ADET
TELEMT
DIB BAHIR
BEYEDA
DEHANA
JAWAKHORA
ABERGELE
TEMBEN
TENKWAMLASH
TSEBERA
AMBERA METEKA
MARAY
MAYCHEW
AXUM
ADWA
HAFTAYLE
AMBA-SENBUTI
INDABATSAHMA
INDAFELASI
GERALTA
INTICHO
ADI ABEYTI
ADI KWALA
IGELA
SENAFE
GOLO MENTIDA
GENTA AFESHUM
AGAME
BUBIA & SAISAI
HULET BELES
TSADA AMBA
ATSIBI
BERAHILE
HULET AWLALO
TSIRA-I
DIDIBA & QERGAIEN
SUBIET
INDERTA
HINTALO
SEHARTI
MIRAB
SELEWA
AUBADAGE
MEHONE
INDAMEHONE
RAYA & AZEBO
DIDIGSALA
CHERCHER
RAYA & KORO
WEFLA
SEKOTA
LIBO
BELESA
MEKELE
DEGA TEMBEN
DALLOL DEPRESSION
AFAR




Map of Tigray.

Region : NORTHERN WELO


10

10.1 Dahana
10.2 Wag
10.3 Lasta
10.4 Wefla
10.5 Raya & Kobo
10.6 Yeju
10.7 Delanta & Dawent
10.8 Meket & Wadla



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WELO



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OLD AWRAJA BOUNDARIES
ARE-1988

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS GROUP

TIGRAY AND NORTH WOLLO

SITUATION REPORT

APRIL-MAY 1992

PART II

CONSTRAINTS TO DONOR RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENT NEEDS, REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Based on a field visit of 3 March to 11 April, 1992
and research in Addis Ababa during May 1992

CCRDA

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

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FOREWORD

Two earlier reports on Tigray and North Wollo which I wrote for the UN Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group (see UN/EPPG Situation Reports for July 1991 and November 1991) were intended to give the reader a picture of various aspects of social and economic conditions in the two regions, and to investigate some of the constraints to development activity. This report takes the analysis one step further, to examine the various factors which have changed or intensified since November.

The sections of the report concerned with life in the countryside are strongly influenced by the work of Alex de Waal and Dessalegn Rahmato. A bibliography and list of further reading is included as an appendix to the report.

My thanks again to EPPG Field Assistant Ato Fitsum Gebre-Medhin, whose contribution to this report in the form of observations during the field trip has been invaluable. I should also like to thank Ato Berhane Haile, regional head of MOA in Tigray; staff of REST in Mekelle and Addis Ababa; the staff of ERO; and officials of EPRDF and local baitos and shengos (people's councils) in various locations. I am grateful to the donor representatives in Addis Ababa who took time to talk to me, and I trust I have not misrepresented their observations, or those of the NGOs in the field who were also so generous with their time.

NOTE ON TERMS

TPLF/ EPRDF. Though the terms are used interchangeably when referring to regional authorities in Tigray, the government in the province is more properly referred to as the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front), as the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) encompasses other political groups as well, groups who play no role in Tigray.

baito - the Tigrinya term given to the administrative council of the assemblies to which all adults of the population belong, These are organized at several levels: tabia (a group of villages, roughly equivalent to a peasants association or kebele in the rest of Ethiopia), woreda (district), and region.

shengo - local people's councils in North Wollo (equivalent of the baitos in Tigray). As the term "Shengo" in Addis Ababa is likely to be confused with the former national structure under the Derg, the expression "local people's councils" or "local councils" is used in this report, although in North Wollo the term most commonly used is shengo.

MOA/DOA. The TPLF Department of Agriculture (DOA) has been integrated with the central Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

CORDA

ECS/JRP and CRS - The ECS, Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, is responsible for the operations of the JRP, Joint Relief Partnership, relief programme in Tigray. CRS, Catholic Relief Services, is responsible for logistics, and arranging for food deliveries to the ECS in Tigray

awraja - administrative sub-region
baito - see above
CRS - Catholic Relief Services
Derg - the term used to refer to the former Ethiopian government
DOA - TPLF Department of Agriculture, now part of MOA
EB - Ethiopian Birr (official exchange rate: 2.07 EB = US$1.00)
ECS - Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat
EECMY/LWF (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus/Lutheran World Federation)
EPDM - Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement, part of EPRDF
EPLF - Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERO - Ethiopian Relief Organization (relief wing of EPDM)
FAO - UN Food and Agriculture Organization
MOA - Ministry of Agriculture
MOH - Ministry of Health
MSF Belgium/Holland - Medecins Sans Frontieres, Belgium/Holland
MSF France - Medecins Sans Frontieres, France
NGO - Non-governmental Organization
production cadres - extension workers under MOA/DOA
quintal - 100 kg
REST - The Relief Society for Tigray
RRC - Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
shengo - local people's councils in North Wollo
tabia - a group of villages, roughly equivalent to a peasants association or kebele in the rest of Ethiopia
teff - cereal cultivated in Ethiopia
TPLF - Tigray People's Liberation Front
WFP - UN World Food Programme
woreda - district

Geographical names: by the end of the war, there had been several de facto changes of boundaries of areas that had been under TPLF or EPRDF/TPLF control for several years. This means that parts of North Gondar and North Wollo are considered part of Tigray. For the most part, awraja names in North Wollo in this report use pre-1988 boundaries. Please see maps at the end of the report.

CORDA

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Part I of this Situation Report for April/May, in the form of a separate document, is a review of the relief operations in Tigray and North Wollo during the first months of 1992. Part II is an examination of some of the current development initiatives in Tigray and North Wollo, in the context of the changing economic and social conditions of the regions. The economy of Tigray has managed to reach a modestly dynamic state due to investment by the private sector. Taxes on business in Tigray and North Wollo form the only basis for current government revenue.

2. There is concern among donors about what form donor relationships with regional governments will take in the future. Though there are many constraints to donors committing funds to Ethiopia for development, lack of action at the regional level in Tigray, with the one already functioning regional government, means that the opportunity to keep up the momentum of programmes started over recent years, and to fulfil promises that help would be focussed on war-affected areas of the country, is being lost. In North Wollo the needs of the region are more basic, but are getting just as little attention from donors. Government attention to North Wollo has only recently improved.

3. There are often tense relations between the regions and central ministries. In Tigray the bureaucracy is considered the new enemy. There is frustration in Mekelle about promised funds not coming from the central ministries. TPLF was not counting on the financial constraints at the centre, and the hostility of the entrenched bureaucracy in Addis Ababa or its power to block budgeted funds. In Addis Ababa, there is unfounded resentment on the part of many people over the imagined draining of resources to Tigray.

4. There was a distinct lack of government structures representing either central government or proto-regional bodies in North Wollo in March. In remoter areas like Sekota, the people have felt abandoned by the central government. Though there is a general passiveness about government in the area, in Sekota the EPRDF administrator and the local people's council (shengo) members are active and interfere in NGO activity.

5. The work of the MOA in Tigray is compared to that in North Wollo. The Tigray branch of the MOA was restructured during the first few months of the year. Shortage of staff at woreda and extension programme level is a problem. The lack of transport was affecting supervision from the Mekelle office. There is increasing control being imposed by the central ministry, and all decisions regarding funding to the Tigray branch of the MOA are now made in Addis Ababa. The most serious constraint facing the regional MOA in expanding its operations is budget shortages.

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New activities have been concentrated on small-scale programmes not involving much investment of funds. The major on-going work of the MOA in Tigray was soil and water conservation.

6. The MOA in North Wollo was still moribund. MOA workers go out to the field empty-handed, so are seen as not having much to offer the farmers. MOA promises of seed and vaccinations for animals did not come through. The farmers saw no benefit from their work for MOA projects in the past, preparing land for tree planting which never happened, and not receiving food for work payments.

7. There was worry that the seeds provided by the FAO programme for Tigray would not arrive in time. Many used this as an argument that funds for the programme would be better used to buy seed locally, or to distribute money to the farmers to purchase seed. The distribution of vegetable seed from the Italian Cooperation agency was a popular programme. Other inputs still in great demand are agricultural instruments, including picks and shovels for soil conservation work.

8. In Tigray the terracing work was widespread; in North Wollo it was nearly non-existent. In Tigray terracing represents the deep commitment of the people to improve the land. The terracing is of a higher quality than last year, with careful training and supervising. The work is done for the community itself and any food for work plans are meant to give an incentive to people in amounts which are only marginally above the relief rations.

9. Much of the discussion of economic and social conditions is a continuation of an examination begun in the November Situation Report, Part II. Focus is on the towns. Though emphasis is on the thriving part of the Tigrean economy, the vast majority of the population in the countryside still has very little purchasing power, and many survive solely on relief rations.

10. In North Wollo there is some interaction between the towns and the countryside, but in isolated areas like Wag peasants have little reason to go to the towns, except for relief food and small purchases. There is a significant contrast between the low purchasing power in North Wollo and the increasing "town wealth" in Tigray.

11. There has been a massive increase in the sale of firewood over the last year, because of increased demand, and because many people have no other source of income.

12. In the Tigray economy the role of the private sector is very important, since little development aid money is going to the area. Mekelle by March was a boom town, with a lot of construction creating many jobs, and a lot of investment by Tigreans. More is available in the market. There are many new businesses,

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including several new factories. Land has been assigned for a cement factory. The negative impact of the boom has been that as shop rents increased some older establishments have been driven out of business. Housing costs in the city are escalating, and inflation has hit the building material business.

13. There are different rates of change and rehabilitation in urban areas outside of Mekelle. In Adigrat much building was going on, and here too there are new factories. Problems have been faced getting supplies of cement from Addis Ababa for the new cement block factory. In Adwa and Axum many new houses were being built by people coming to the towns with two or three million Ethiopian birr to invest, many of them prosperous businessmen who left Eritrea.

14. The significance of trade with Eritrea for economic growth in Tigray was examined in the November Situation report. This has not expanded again, thus the more important economic links are now with the centre, but trade and other economic links with Eritrea will still be a key factor in the long run. The continued economic depression in Eritrea has had a severe impact on the northern towns of Tigray. In Agame awraja many people still have family members in Eritrea.

15. Details are given on taxes at the border. On the Eritrean side, taxes for items like coffee are very high, at 27-30%, but lower on needed agricultural products. The major items going into Eritrea are teff, some coffee, unground peppers for berberi (zala berberi), gesho (used in fermenting local beer), and honey in small quantities. Taxes imposed on the Tigray side of the border vary from 5% on agricultural goods to 24% on imported items. There is a fixed tax imposed on salt coming from Massawa, partly as a way to protect the market for Tigray salt. Strict EPLF regulations on cutting trees in Eritrea have led to a greater demand for wood and charcoal smuggled from Tigray.

16. There is an increase in trade and activity in the main towns along the highway through North Wollo, though the economy is not recovering in the same way as that of Tigray. In North Wollo migration for labour is an important coping strategy, and may well play as major a role in the North Wollo non-monetary economy as the return of Tigrean capital to Tigray plays in that much more cash-based economy. From the Sekota area whole families migrate on a regular basis to Gojjam or Gondar, or east to Korem, to the same locations each year. Families return to their land in Wag in time to prepare their land for the Meher season planting. It is possible that the presence of these migrant workers may even be necessary for the high production levels of the surplus areas in Gondar and Gojjam.

17. There is a steady flow of people returning to North Wollo from resettlement areas and elsewhere. Some come with resources,

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so can add to family animal holdings, or make improvements to the farm. In other cases, those from resettlement are a burden on the community. Administration officials are concerned that these people, like returning ex-soldiers, have no land allotted to them, though in some cases family members had remained in North Wollo to tend family land. A case study of one family shows that there had been continuous contact between resettlement areas and home villages. Those returning have had exposure to other levels of social services and possibilities of off-farm work, which may be changing expectations and attitudes towards both. Ex-soldiers in many parts of North Wollo, cause problems out of proportion to their numbers, as they often try to intimidate the EPRDF administrators and local people's council members.

18. Schooling in most of North Wollo is usually limited to the 1st and 2nd grade, with just a few schools up to the 7th grade. In Wag there is pressure to have primary education in the Agau language. WFP is now considering support for school feeding programmes to encourage school attendance.

19. Profiles of three towns are given as case studies to show the different economic and social conditions in Abi Adi, Temben awraja, Tigray, and in the two North Wollo towns of Sekota in Wag awraja and Lalibela in Lasta awraja. Abi Adi and Sekota were previously examined in the November Situation Report. Abi Adi represents the vitality of smaller Tigrean towns getting back on their feet, while Sekota and Lalibela are typical of the lack of animation in the economy and society of North Wollo as a whole, and represent the continued peripheralization of many parts of the region.

20. The examination of changes within the Tigray branch of the Ministry of Health focusses on the change of management style since the setting up of the integrated Ministry made up of MOH and TPLF field trained hospital staff, the cutbacks in the budget from the central ministry, and the decline in the level of health care in the region since these changes. The declining standard of health care, in spite of forty-seven doctors being sent to Tigray, is attributed to lack of motivation in the returning MOH staff. Cutbacks affect in-hospital feeding, something not covered by MOH elsewhere in the country, but part of the agreement between TPLF and MOH in Tigray after the war.

21. Donors in Ethiopia are waiting for the political structures at the regional level to emerge, to see how these will affect development policy. This affects attitudes to committing development funds for Tigray. In addition, insecurity and the relations between different groups in other parts of the country make donors reluctant to start new programmes. Most development efforts are de facto delayed until the end of the Transitional phase of government. The recent lifting of the Brook amendment in the United States may change this static situation, if USAID

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involvement in development assistance leads the way for other donors. Some donors are suspicious of the socialist principles of the Tigray regional government. These appear to coexist in a pragmatic way with private enterprise, which is being encouraged by the regional authorities. Some donors fear criticism if they appear to be favouring Tigray over other regions. Some assume that others will be working there. Alternatively there is the assumption that participating in the World Bank Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Project and providing help for the relief operations is enough of a commitment to the area. The emergency focus is no longer on the north of the country, which means that rehabilitation funds for the area are now lower on the agenda. The impact of the continuing economic recession in the West on donor response to development needs is also a factor. Many donors are stretched thin by emergency commitments elsewhere.

22. North Wollo has had a history of failed and abandoned development projects in recent years due to withdrawal of personnel and resources because of the war. High expectations about NGO work in North Wollo were raised by the large number of projects during and following the famine of 1984/85. NGOs currently working in the area find their deliberately small scale efforts being compared to former projects in which many people were employed. There are very few NGOs working in North Wollo. The number of NGOs in Tigray has not increased substantially over the past months. The region depends on its traditional NGO supporters, who helped in cross-border programmes. REST still plays a strong coordinating role, and helps to set priorities. RRC has opened an office in Mekelle, but has few resources. Donors wishing to support small but long-term projects might consider increasing assistance to the Church groups who have a history of development work in the area.

23. Conclusions and recommendations include the following: there is a need for more base line data for both Tigray and North Wollo, along with information on specific aspects of society such as people returning from resettlement areas and labour migration patterns, studies which could perhaps use the human resources of the University of Addis Ababa; central ministries should be monitored to ensure that designated funds reach the regions; Massawa should be considered as a port of entry for development project supplies for northern Tigray; North Wollo suffers from not having a strong advocate specifically for the area, though ERO attempts to bring attention to the needs of this region as part of its larger area of focus; seed programmes should concentrate on the distribution of funds to farmers for the purchase of the most appropriate seed locally; projects to assist women could include providing much needed grinding mills more widely; support should be given to REST and MOA food for work programmes in Tigray; and for best results, reforestation programmes should provide the kind of tree seedlings desired by the farmers.

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II. INTRODUCTION

1. Part I of this Situation Report for April/May (which is in the form of a separate document) is a review of the relief operations in Tigray and North Wollo during the first months of 1992. It includes the "view from Addis Ababa", in that it examines some of the operational aspects handled by the headquarters of the coordinating relief agencies, and factors affecting donor response to the relief needs. Part II, below, is an examination of some of the current development initiatives in Tigray and North Wollo, in the context of the changing economic and social conditions of the regions. This part of the report concentrates on what is taking place in the regions, but again relates this to donor attitudes, and to the role of the central ministries in Addis Ababa. Frequent reference is made to an earlier look at some of these subjects, in the EPPG November 1991 Situation Report for the two regions.

2. The report begins with a look at the often tense relationships between the regional branch offices of the central ministries in Tigray (integrated departments composed of TPLF department staff and ministry staff who returned to the region since the end of the war) and their head offices. The rest of the section on government looks at some of the issues which may emerge with the setting up of formal relationships between donors and regional governments in the future, and discusses some of implications of the nearly complete lack of government structures, or sense of any kind of government at all except at the local level, in North Wollo.

3. The two ministries that are examined as examples of the evolving relations with the centre are the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Health (MOH). Internal changes in the regional departments of these ministries are also described.

4. There is a brief examination of how the economy and society of Tigray has managed to reach a modestly dynamic state due to investment by the private sector, and in the absence of development aid. This is compared to economic and social conditions in North Wollo. The impact of the continuing economic depression in Eritrea on trading patterns with Tigray is touched upon in a section that includes an examination of the customs duties imposed on items being traded across the border.

5. Later in the report is an analysis of why there is a lack of donor commitments to development in Tigray and how this reflects the lack of development money being pledged for new projects in Ethiopia in general at this time.

6. In general, donors in Ethiopia are now taking a wait and see attitude, due to the expected changes in government structure which will follow the elections for regional governments. This

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is understandable, in view of the need to know what structures they will be dealing with in the future. But in the meantime, lack of action at the regional level in Tigray, with the one already functioning regional government, means that the opportunity to keep up the momentum of programmes started over recent years, and to fulfil promises that help would be focussed on war-affected areas of the country, is being lost.

7. This donor neglect of Tigray is in spite of conditions in that region which make it different from other parts of the country, and which under other general circumstances might have led donors to consider it a prime candidate for development projects: peace, structures in place, and a strong community based approach to development. One Tigrean observer spoke of "an agenda of rehabilitation" being in place, and suggested that the people of Tigray know the struggle to establish an economic and political structure, in contrast to other areas, where this has not yet been something people have been able to establish. The same observer suggested that for general regional development there is a need for a regional administration which will look after the region's own interests, something which other parts of the country do not yet benefit from.

8. Tigray has reached another stage of transition, which includes being absorbed into the central bureaucracy. People in Tigray frequently speak of "the new war", or the next stage of the Struggle, in which the bureaucracy is the new enemy.

9. North Wollo is a long distance behind Tigray in development terms, with the gap widening all the time. The needs of the region are more basic, but are getting just as little attention from donors. Government attention to North Wollo has recently improved, but the people of the area do not feel they have been justly compensated for the hardship they experienced during the war, when they suffered punishment by the government side for their support of the resistance forces.

10. Although the subject is not dealt with in this report, an unspoken issue which lies behind the lack of much current development planning in Ethiopia is the question of land tenure or land ownership, and what form this will take in the future. There is perhaps not enough discussion about the land issue among donors at this time, though this reflects the fact that debate on the subject is being firmly postponed by the current government to the post-Transitional period.

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III. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS

1. This section is divided into three parts: relations between regional offices of ministries and central authorities, regional government, and local government.

A. RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIONS AND CENTRAL AUTHORITIES

2. The relations between previous TPLF departments and central ministries, now part of the same integrated ministries, is a continuation of a discussion begun in the earlier November Situation Report. The situation now can be summarized by the battle cry among frustrated ex-TPLF department people and the general population in Mekelle: War with the bureaucrats. The situation is described by one observer as the people of Tigray now being "strangled by the system they were fighting", and it is clear that the bureaucracy is now well entrenched. This has led some to wonder whether the revolutionary energy in Tigrean society is evaporating. Discussing this situation in Mekelle and in central ministry offices in Addis Ababa one has the sense that war has already been won, by the bureaucrats. This is especially true within the MOH, and increasingly so within the MOA. More optimistic observers point out that this war is not yet over.

2. For the Tigray branch of the MOA, losing the war with the central bureaucrats means that all decisions regarding funding are made in Addis Ababa, and contrary to earlier expectations, it appears that donors wishing to support agricultural projects in Tigray can no longer deal directly with the Ministry of Agriculture branch office in Mekelle. All dealings must now be through the Addis Ababa ministry offices. This is a distinct change from November, when it was still possible to make project plans in Mekelle. This is undoubtedly because of the central ministry's need to control funds and overall planning, but means that the decentralization which was hoped for on the part of, for instance, TPLF officials in Tigray, will meet resistance from the ministries. This is probably not a static situation, and will change as formal regional government structures are set up in other parts of the country, but at the moment is leading to a certain paralysis in development activities insofar as these are controlled from the centre.

3. Perhaps a factor which led to an early expectation after the war on the part of people in Tigray that the integrated departments of the TPLF and central ministries would benefit from central budget resources, to which the region obviously had no access for many years, was the lack of realization in Tigray of the financial constraints at the centre. There was also not enough awareness of the lack of interest in assisting Tigray, and the hostility of the entrenched bureaucracy and its attendant power to block budgeted funds from reaching Tigray. This applies even to some emergency funds earmarked for war-affected areas.

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4. This attitude from the centre is not limited in its impact to the north, as branch offices in other parts of the country complain about the same lack of action from the MOA or the MOH, but it is resented perhaps most strongly in Tigray, as there were already active programmes in place which depended for on-going progress on funds from the centre to replace funds previously raised directly. Another part of the resentment and frustration in Tigray comes from the feeling on the part of officials there that they were misled on the matter of funding by the central ministries.

5. At the other end, in Addis Ababa, there is unfounded resentment on the part of many people over the imagined draining of resources to Tigray. Our findings, and those of other visitors to Tigray, were that most of the improvements taking place in the towns were the result of private initiative and investment. Development in the countryside is restricted almost exclusively to public works: the massive mobilization of the population for terracing as part of the soil and water conservation programme.

6. There is a serious morale problems in many of the central ministries, where bureaucrats are faced with the uncertainties of what the future structures of their ministries will be in relationship to the regional governments, and what this will mean about the future of their own jobs. It is a pity when this lowered morale leads to the sabotage, knowingly or unknowingly, of regional development initiatives.

B. REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

7. This section does not look at the subject of regional government in any depth, as the field visit on which the following observations are based took place some time in advance of the planned regional elections. What is discussed here is how some aspects of the issue were perceived ahead of the elections, and to contrast the lack of awareness in North Wollo on the subject to the situation in Tigray, where there is a de facto regional government in place. Most of North Wollo will of course be just one part of a larger Amhara region, while Tigray will remain a separate region on its own, with perhaps changed boundaries.

8. In certain North Wollo communities we brought up the question of whether Tigrean-speaking areas of North Wollo would join Tigray. The subject was under debate at the time in these areas, and no decision had yet been made. The response to our question in Alamata was that many people were not interested in joining Tigray because this would mean "too many meetings". They were also not anxious to join the mobilized population of Tigray out terracing the countryside every day (this was at a time when the season of terracing work was at its height).

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9. The whole issue of regional government in Tigray raises questions about the future relations between REST, RRC, donors, NGOs, regional branches of the ministries, and central ministries. There has been an assumption on the part of some donors that the setting up of regional governments will mean that donors can negotiate directly with the new regional authorities. This is based on the expectation that the regional government will get certain funds from the centre, and can raise local revenue and get direct external assistance. This was not yet clearly spelled out in May. UNICEF is currently able to work directly with regional authorities in its water projects, but several donors have found that this kind of arrangement is not possible at this time.

10. In Tigray there is a slight shift in the way the people in outlying areas are reported to be viewing the Mekelle administration. There is still very widespread support, and pride in the regional government, but outside of Mekelle, in places where during the war there was a greater autonomy due to the constraints on communication and travel, and where, as a result, "the people were in control", there is now some resentment over the inevitable control being asserted from Mekelle.

11. We could get no satisfactory answer from local officials in North Wollo in late March about what they perceive a regional government, probably based in distant Bahar Dar, will mean. Details in the region about what would be involved were extremely sketchy at that time, including whether there would be a separate Amhara and Agau government for an area where the two groups are closely integrated, and according to Agau we spoke to, see themselves as sharing the same culture, with only language as the factor which differentiates them. Many Agau can speak Amharic, although there is pressure to have primary and literacy education in Agau. There is a lot of intermarriage between Amhara, Agau, and Tigreans in the region. Perhaps there is a strong sense of separate Agau identity in other Agau areas in Gojjam, but in Wag this did not appear to be an issue with the people we interviewed. The feeling that no-one yet knew what a regional government would be like was summed up by one EPRDF administrator who asked "What will it be worth?" In remoter parts of North Wollo there was still little knowledge of the planned electoral process. It will be interesting for future visitors to the area to compare this with the level of political awareness in future. The contrast to Tigray, where there was much discussion about what the implications of democracy were, including the right of opposition EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) representatives to speak, was quite striking.

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C. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

12. There was still, in April, a distinct lack of government structures representing either central government or proto-regional bodies, in North Wollo. The absence of effective government ministry offices has an impact on development; there is little structure within which donors can work, as these local governing bodies cannot fill the same function.

13. Local political attitudes and relations between the local governing groups perhaps have a more distinct impact in North Wollo than in Tigray. Relations between EPRDF administrators and the executives of the local people's councils (shengos) and the relations between both and any NGOs working in the area, are different from place to place. In the awrajas of Wag and Lasta, the relationship between local councils, EPRDF administrators, and the few central government ministry representatives who are present, is an uneasy one. Traditionally, the people of Wag have always considered themselves very independent of the central authorities, and before the revolution of 1974 were governed by an hereditary ruler, the Wagshum. In Lasta, a general deep suspicion of politics reflects the deep conservatism of the community, which has always been strongly under the influence of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The implications of these factors on relations with the future regional government may be of some significance. It will be interesting as well to watch how local authorities used to a great deal of autonomy during and since the war, will react to having to receive guidance on matters of government from the eventual regional capital.

14. In remoter areas like Sekota, there is a certain resentment towards EPRDF among the people of the area, who have felt abandoned by the central government. Though the general picture is of a certain passiveness about government in North Wollo, in Sekota the town population is described by people working there as being very political, with the EPRDF administrator and the local council members all expecting to have their say on matters relating to, for instance, NGO activity in the area. NGO workers speak of the confusion caused by frequent change of central government personnel in Sekota, where there had been three EPRDF administrators in six months. They refer to the problems of reaching agreements with officials, only to have the officials transferred elsewhere, so that the agreements fall apart.

15. It is hard to gauge the influence of the councils (shengos), in contrast to the baitos in Tigray, who are in close interaction with the people who elect them. In some of the larger towns in North Wollo it is difficult to find the offices of the local council, as townspeople often seem unclear of the location. People did not seem to relate to the local councils except in the way they did to the kebele administration in the past, and we were told by one council chairman that most of the work of the

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council is town security and the day to day problems of peasants and urban dwellers, listening to complaints from people about not having access to health care or relief aid. The elected people's council structure at the time of our visit only existed up to the woreda level. The EPRDF administrative system, which we understood was to be replaced by the regional government structure, included administrators at several levels, with a representative of the Transitional Government at the zoba, or region, level. (It did not appear that the EPRDF administrators in the awraja capitals reported to this position. Government in North Wollo at this point was a rather shadowy subject, with few clearly defined lines of responsibility discernable.) Thus democratic representation was much less developed than in Tigray. This may explain the sense of there not being any strong "government" in the area.

16. A major significance of the trading and marketing activities now taking place in North Wollo and especially Tigray is that they form the only basis for current government revenue: until the establishment of regional governments, most taxes are in abeyance, and the only ones being collected are from licenses and taxes imposed on traders or owners of small businesses, tea rooms, tej bets, hotels, or small shops.

IV. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE - TIGRAY COMPARED TO NORTH WOLLO

1. As is shown in this section, the differences between the MOA in Tigray and North Wollo are immense. The stagnant situation in the North Wollo MOA offices described in the November Situation Report has not changed, though more returning MOA staff have been assigned positions in the field, while MOA Tigray, for all the problems it faces with the central ministry, is extremely active.

A. TIGRAY

2. The Tigray branch of the Ministry of Agriculture was in the process of being restructured during the first few months of the year. Problems identified by the MOA regional head, the previous head of TPLF Department of Agriculture (DOA), included a serious shortage of staff at woreda and extension programme level. To take care of this for the present, MOA was moving production cadres from the lowest village level ("tabia" or "kushet" levels) to higher levels of extension work, and training grade 12 school leavers in Mekelle for extension programme work. In the regional office there were enough personnel, but not enough transport, which was affecting possibilities of supervision from the Mekelle office. Returning MOA staff are not accustomed to walking in order to reach the people in the countryside. The MOA regional head contrasted this to the more dedicated way of working of the TPLF part of the staff (many of whom retain their status of fighters), but realistically described it as an attitude that would take time to change, and was sure that in a few months the

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returning staff would be effective members of the department. Changes in motivation were necessary, he said, which could only come from working with the people, and could not be changed by authoritarian methods. On the administrative side, in contrast to the fighters in the department who had always worked with very little, these returning or new staff needed per diem, materials and so forth, which were all new problems for the fledgling MOA integrated office to deal with (and meant that work was held up by lack of funds, which had not influenced them strongly in the past).

3. The relationship of the Mekelle branch of the MOA and Addis Ababa was analysed at some depth in its early stages in the November Situation Report. Another shift in the relations has occurred, as mentioned above in the introduction. It appears that the hoped for new relationship of region and centre described to us in November is not going to be possible, at least not in the immediate future. With increasing control being imposed by the central ministry, all bilateral assistance to the region must go through the Addis Ababa offices of the MOA. NGOs interested in helping with agricultural development are welcome to work in Tigray, but are also expected to work through MOA Addis Ababa. This appears to exclude those who in the past have worked closely with REST.

4. The most serious constraint facing the regional MOA in expanding its operations is budget shortages. The budgeted money which had been agreed upon last year, at the time of the integration of MOA and DOA, has not been released from the centre. The Mekelle office was facing the frustration of needing to exert constant pressure on the Addis Ababa office. By May they were told that funds were finished, and that they would have to wait until the new fiscal year (beginning in July) to receive additional money, though it appeared that by mid-June certain funds had been finally wrestled from the ministry so that orders for more vehicles could be placed. Of the vehicles previously requested, only one had been received by April. Earlier in the year, REST and TPLF representatives had asked central ministry representatives, especially those of the MOA, to let them know if something was beyond the capacity of the central ministry, and they would try to raise the funds themselves. The attitude in REST and MOA Mekelle is that MOA Addis Ababa would not admit at the time that the funds would not be available, and thus time and momentum were lost. The rehabilitation of MOA buildings in Mekelle and elsewhere is proceeding slowly, as the central office is not providing materials or funds in necessary amounts.

5. Discussions about the contrasts between the present and the previous way of working in Tigray kept coming back to the question of morale and motivation, with MOA Tigray finding itself limited in its work by the absence of motivation from above at the Addis Ababa level. As a result, new activities had been

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concentrated on small-scale programmes not involving much investment of funds, such as irrigation construction and maintenance of earth dams. One new dam was under construction. Animal health clinics were another focus. The major on-going work of the MOA in Tigray was soil and water conservation.

6. Examples of the problems faced by MOA workers outside of Mekelle came from discussions with staff in the Maichew-Mahoni area. Almost all of the previous MOA staff had returned by April, and were facing problems of housing, and health problems in an area where few medical supplies were available. As elsewhere in the MOA, they had no petty cash to work with, no vehicle, and "not even a mule", so had to go to outer areas by foot.

7. There are conflicting stories about whether previous MOA staff are accepted by the people of the countryside or not. According to the regional head in Mekelle, TPLF had held conferences at the beginning of year, involving all levels of the Tigray population, to discuss the subject of "how to treat the new ministry people". The people were told that they should not concentrate on the shortcomings of the staff in the past, because it was the system that had made them like that. People were encouraged to see them "as their brothers" who needed to be shown how to think for the development of their country. They were told that Tigray was short of professionals, so that the returning experts had needed skills. The MOA regional head acknowledged that there was still some suspicion of the old MOA staff, since the people knew them when they worked under Derg, but felt this would change if the staff worked hard for the people.

8. That is the ideal, which may take some time to take effect, since in the Mahoni area we were told by returning MOA workers that the people saw them as Derg supporters, so they do not get much cooperation, in contrast to the TPLF extension workers. It does not appear to make much difference when the MOA stress that in the past it had been the Party that forced them to do certain things which were not MOA policy. The situation is complicated by claims from the people that MOA in the past had ordered soil conservation work, and promised food for work, which had not arrived by the time MOA pulled out for security reasons, so that workers had not been paid. The farmers say to them "You ate our grain" (the food payments).

B. NORTH WOLLO

9. The MOA in North Wollo was still moribund at the time of our visit in March and April. As described in the November report, the regional headquarters in Woldiya is demoralized and without resources. A general problem throughout the region is that MOA workers go out to the field empty-handed, so are seen by the people as not having much to offer. In the Sekota office of the

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MOA, two recently reassigned staff members sit with nothing to do. In this area there has been no agricultural programme for ten years, so that the MOA must begin again from scratch, difficult to do with no resources available to them. There has been no terracing work in the area, and only basic irrigation work. Officials spoke of there being no plan from the government for this awraja in reforestation or anything else. There is strong hostility to the MOA based on the fact that the people "got no profit out of the Ministry of Agriculture in the past". Even in recent months, MOA told them that they would vaccinate animals and distribute seed; people were sent to Korem to bring back the seed, but were not given any. As elsewhere in North Wollo, the promised vaccines never appeared. The farmers are described as having got fed up in the past with preparing land for forest planting and then seeing nothing happen, so saw no benefit to the work, especially when at the same time food for work non-payment was a regular problem. This attitude appears from our brief survey to be quite widespread in North Wollo.

10. The absence of animal vaccines was a complaint in many areas. A recent SCF UK nutritional survey report for North Wollo states that farmers in the Raya and Kobo area were worried about a Rinderpest epidemic.

C. SEED PROGRAMMES

11. There was deep worry that the seeds provided by the FAO programme for Tigray would not arrive in time. It was not clear if MOA was going to be able to buy what was planned, because of shortages in the country. Transport was a serious problem. Many used this as an argument that funds for the programme would be better used to buy seed locally, or to distribute money to the farmers to purchase seed. Even when the seed arrived in Tigray, transport problems for onward transport from Mekelle were envisioned. On several different occasions we were told by people in the region that if the rain comes, seed is always available in the area, and that the farmers would get it one way or another. Frequently better off farmers hold back significant quantities of seed, which are lent out to poorer farmers in return for a portion of the harvest. Many argue that the seed which can be purchased in any given area is the most appropriate kind for that area, thus providing money is always better than bringing in seed. This also becomes a way to keep support for local varieties, as the best indigenous ones to an area are disease and pest resistance, and drought resistant. Seed distributed in Sekota, we were told, is invariably sold so that people can purchase the seed they want locally.

12. A very popular programme in Tigray was the distribution of vegetable seed from the Italian Cooperation agency. Farmers in, for instance Abi Adi, were described as open to new things, and happy to plant these vegetable seeds, though there is not a

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strong tradition of growing vegetables, at least not for home consumption: except for the few vegetables which play a major part in the preparation of food, such as onions, most are seen as a strictly cash crop. There have been occasional problems with the growing of vegetables, and farmers in Mahoni, who also received seeds from Italians, reported that rodents, which exist in large numbers as they survive unmolested among the cactus growths of the area, are a serious problem. As a result, vegetable growing in this area is apparently not generally successful. In other areas, the stone walls used for terracing land also harbour rodents, which may mean that certain areas are simply not appropriate for vegetable planting.

13. Other inputs still in great demand are agricultural instruments, including picks and shovels for soil conservation work. In Abi Adi in Temben awraja of Tigray we were told that these came in the past from TPLF workshops, but that none were made locally. Support is needed for not just the admirable central TPLF hand tool workshops, but for setting up more of these in the awrajas.

D. SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION - TERRACING

14. Because of the timing of our visit, we had a chance to see a great deal of community terracing work first hand. The differences between Tigray and North Wollo in terms of terracing are immediate and make a deep impression. In Tigray the terracing work was widespread; in North Wollo it was nearly non-existent except in a few areas close to reactivated nurseries (where WFP was restarting its food for work programmes). The work of the communities in Tigray in soil and water conservation is representative of the deep commitment of the people to do anything they can to improve the land. The terracing we saw in most of the parts of Tigray we visited is of a higher quality than what we saw last year, and there had clearly been careful training and supervising taking place. People of the towns as well as the countryside were active. The terracing work was not uniform, but on the whole was quite impressive. The best terracing we saw was in the Temben highlands, and Subha and Saisai woreda in Agame awraja. The work well deserves support for food assistance to these communities, where often the work has been done on a voluntary basis because of lack of supplies for food for work. There is some variety in approaches to the food for work issue in the region, and in some areas work had been done on the basis of promises of future payment. REST and MOA officials hope to give an incentive to people in the form of food payments which are only marginally above the rations they are getting as relief distributions. This should not be seen as traditional food for work, as the motivation for the terracing work is that it benefits the community itself.

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V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

A. GENERAL

1. Much of the following discussion is a continuation of an examination begun in the November Situation Report, Part II. General contrasts between Tigray and North Wollo are mentioned, followed by a description of current conditions in Tigray and the state of trade with Eritrea. The description of general economic and social conditions in North Wollo concentrates on migration as an important coping strategy. (Migration may well play as important a role in the North Wollo non-monetary economy as the return of Tigrean capital to Tigray plays in that much more cash-based economy.) The final section presents case studies of three towns. A fair amount of detailed information is given here, as it is felt that not much of this information is available in other reports for those interested in following the economic and social changes in the region. Although the emphasis is on the thriving part of the Tigrean economy, it must be remembered that the vast majority of the population in the countryside still has very little purchasing power, and many survive solely on relief rations.

2. The focus in this report, as in the November report, is on the towns. In North Wollo, though there is some interaction with countryside (as analysed by Dessalegn and de Waal), in some parts, such as the relatively isolated awraja of Wag, there is not much reason for peasants to go to the towns, except for relief, and very occasionally for a limited number of things in the market (clothing, ploughshares, or a small number of household items). This reflects not just the low purchasing power of the peasants, but is also a sign of the extreme self-sufficiency of the peasants, at least during years of reasonable harvests. In recent years, even in good years, there has been little surplus, thus the farmers are not involved in the market as sellers. One form of interaction between the town and countryside was brought to our attention in Kobo: in areas where the economy is active enough that there is some money, for example Kobo or Alamata, the merchants play a role in lending money to the farmers. In addition, merchants often own land or cultivate land they have rented from others (this is often on an arrangement that lasts up to five years, and appears to have continued even in areas under the Derg during the time it was illegal), and many own animals, which are taken from the towns every day for grazing.

3. There is a significant contrast between this low purchasing power in North Wollo and the increasing "town wealth" in Tigray, which will be looked at more specifically in the case studies of three towns at the end of this section. Mention has already been

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made of how important in Tigray the role of the private sector is, since there is little development aid money is going in to the area.

4. Note should be taken of a very harmful economic reality of many parts of North Wollo and Tigray, and this is the massive increase in the sale of firewood, which is leading to a high rate of tree cutting. In the middle of the treeless plain outside Adi Gudom, a short distance south of Mekelle, are big piles of wood for sale, brought from great distances for sale mainly to relief truck drivers on their return trip towards the south. A huge Saturday fuel wood market takes place in Mekelle, where wood and charcoal are purchased not just for local use, but according to some rumours, for the large profitable market in Eritrea. The reason for the increase in the amount of firewood for sale is not just increased demand. Many people have no other source of income, either because of the drought which meant small harvests on their land last year, or because they have no access to land, such as many of the ex-soldiers and others returning to North Wollo. There is thus a very close connection between drought and deforestation, though in areas where firewood is primarily obtained from pollarding eucalyptus trees which then send out new stems as they continue their growth, the major reason for current deforestation in the full sense of trees being uprooted, is the pressure of population growth (see Alemneh Dejene).

B. TIGRAY

5. In general, though trade has picked up considerably, local Tigrean traders are limited by the kind of trading licenses they can obtain. The ones they are issued in Mekelle are only valid for Tigray, and are not recognized by the Ministry of Trade in Addis Ababa, thus traders cannot purchase goods in places like Dessie or Bati to bring back in any quantity to Tigray (there is a "customs" check in Woldiya). This means only small time trade is possible. An exception to this is the number of Tigreans obtaining new trading licenses in Addis Ababa.

Mekelle

6. Mekelle by March could well be described as a boom town, with a great deal of building construction in evidence, and substantial amounts of private money coming back into the area, in the form of investment by Tigreans. This is in strong contrast to the past, when it was more expedient for Tigreans with money to hide it away, or invest it elsewhere in the country. We were frequently told that the main change in the city over the past year is this high amount of investment.

7. In the market in Mekelle much more is available now. Especially visible is the great quantities of used clothing for sale. It is easier to get many basic items, but it must be

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mentioned that the market is still of modest size, and nothing like Dessie further south in Wollo. The variety of goods available is still limited. With the increase in business and movement of goods and people, there are more taxis and private vehicles in the streets.

8. Large numbers of new business licenses have been issued in Tigray, and more than forty new businesses had begun in recent months in the Mekelle area alone. Among the new factories that have been set up are those for shoes, toilet paper, and oil extraction. Land has been assigned for a cement factory, which was expected to start construction soon. A new flour mill has been built nearby in Quiha.

9. There are, however, limitations to this boom, and a negative impact as well for those who had established modest businesses in the past. The cost of shop rents is going up, and in some cases is driving these older establishments out of business. The value of housing in the city is escalating, and a villa worth 80,000 EB in the past can now sell for 300,000 to 500,000 EB. We heard various reports of the impact of this on small renters, such as the story of tenants being evicted from a place that before rented for 100 EB a month, so that the owner could charge 500 EB a month. Rents for small stores or rooms for bunabets, (literally "coffee houses", but used in general as a term for any bar), are now 1,500-1,800 EB a month, a reflection of the demand for this kind of premises. Inflation has hit the building material business as a result: in Mekelle, where most building is of stone, the cost by April was one EB for one piece of building stone. This also reflects the high level of investment needed to build a house in Mekelle. The positive impact on the community of all this building going on is the number of jobs it creates, as people can make 7 EB a day as simple labourers in construction, assisting masons who make 20 EB a day. People from the countryside come to the city for this kind of employment, which therefore helps household income outside the city itself, and stimulates the economy in general.

10. So much investment is happening that people coming back to Mekelle learn that there is a lot of competition, which drives up the cost of starting a business. The report that an individual needs to invest as much as 100,000 EB for even a simple restaurant reflects the amounts of money that are being brought back or "repatriated" to Tigray. In some ways, there is too much money coming into the area, and not enough outlets. So many people are setting up bars and hotels that these may soon reach saturation point.

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Other areas of Tigray

11. There are different rates of change and rehabilitation in urban areas outside of Mekelle. In Adigrat a massive amount of building was going on in the first few months of the year, stretching to the edge of the town. The impact of the displaced population from Eritrea, now for the most part dispersed, is still felt, with at least 4,000 of the former camp inhabitants now settled in the town. (Some give a higher estimate). Though prices are lower now that most of the displaced have left, Adigrat is still a more expensive place to live than Mekelle. Adigrat now has a new oil extraction factory, a shoe factory, a soap factory, a nail factory and a cement block factory. A problem for the last mentioned, which is important to meet local construction demands, is that supplies of cement from Addis Ababa were promised, but were not being delivered.

12. We were told that in Adwa as well, and especially in Axum, many new houses were being built, and people were coming to the towns with two or three million EB to invest. Many of these people are those who left Eritrea after living there for many years, often as prosperous business people. Because of the numbers of people returning, and the large numbers of people coming from all over Ethiopia on pilgrimages to the Church of St. Mary in Axum once more, rents are high. Water problems are reported in Adwa as well as in Axum. Though numbers of foreign tourists are low, the big tourist hotel in Axum has reopened. The electricity supply is reported to have improved, and in Adwa the generator provides power between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. (In Mekelle, power is now available 24 hours a day.)

C. TRADE BETWEEN TIGRAY AND ERITREA

13. The significance of trade with Eritrea for economic growth in Tigray was examined in the November Situation report. As this has not expanded again, and in fact appears to have dropped in the first few months of this year, the more important economic links are now with the centre, as Tigrean money from Addis Ababa and other areas to the south is brought back to be invested in Tigray, and supply routes for trade goods are established through Addis Ababa and Assab. But as trade and other economic links with Eritrea will still be a key factor in the long run, this report includes the following up-date on the trading patterns previously examined in the November Situation Report. Some of this information was collected in March in Tigray, but as we did not visit towns west of Adigrat, details from other people who have been in that area are included. Other information was collected on a visit to Eritrea in January.

14. The impact of the continued economic depression in Eritrea is severe for the northern towns of Tigray. Since January there has been a decrease in the amount of road traffic back and forth into

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Eritrea from Agame. The most important aspect of this is that Eritrea was not able to import as much from Tigray, though there is still on-going trade, as described below.

15. There are continued ties other than trade with Eritrea, as in Agame awraja many people still have family members in Eritrea, and there are many Tigrean businessmen still in Asmara and other Eritrean towns. This was confirmed from first-hand information in Asmara in January, when it became clear that the reports of whole-scale expulsion of Tigreans and other non-Eritreans out of Eritrea last summer had been exaggerations.

16. Though there is resentment over restrictions on trade imposed from the Eritrean side, relations with Eritrea were described by Tigrean officials as a "mostly smooth relationship": people on the Tigrean side of the border have been told by TPLF to not be aggressive, and to be patient. Communication was still difficult in March, but since then phone links have been reconnected (at the end of May), which may have eased the situation. Movement of people back and forth across the border continues, though visa procedures by EPLF seemed to be arbitrarily changed from time to time. Large numbers of people from across the Eritrean border come to the Zala Ambesa weekly market.

17. The following information on taxes at the border was obtained from a customs officer in Zala Ambasa, where we had gone to investigate what had sometimes been rather wild rumours about EPLF taxes on items taken into Eritrea ("EPLF taxes non-Eritrean traders 200% on items they take to Asmara") which were circulating in Mekelle and elsewhere. The truth appeared to be much more realistic: items that are highly taxed are likely to be things such as electronic items that small-time smugglers try to bring in. Though there was no clear picture of taxes on the Eritrean side, we were told at the border that on things like coffee, it was very high, at 27-30%. On needed agricultural items, it was definitely lower. It was clear that EPLF also taxed Eritrean traders, so there was not any preferential system, as rumoured, though this may exist in other forms. One reason given for decreased trade by Tigrean merchants going into Eritrea was that though taxes on the Eritrean side were meant to be imposed at one point only, now local towns in Eritrea were said to be imposing their own taxes on items moving through their areas. Like other information above, we were unable to confirm this. But whatever the current taxation system in place, there were lots of small traders moving back and forth across the border, coming from many different places, carrying small amounts of 20-50 kg. The major items going into Eritrea were teff (in large amounts, much of it from as far away as Karikore in North Shoa, where the demand from Eritrea kept teff prices up for local purchasers, and some from Adwa, crossing at other border points), some coffee, unground peppers for berberi (zala berberi), gesho (used in fermenting local beer), and honey in small quantities.

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18. Most of the discussion with the customs official in Zala Ambasa centred on the taxes imposed on the Tigray side of the border on both imports and exports. These were as follows: for agricultural goods, 5%; industrial goods - domestically produced, 12% (except clothes and thread, 15%), imported items 24%. Animals were taxed at the same rate as other agricultural items, 5%, though it was clear that most animals moving on the hoof did not pass through customs points. We heard from another source that the demand in Eritrea for items from the Adwa area such as eggs and chickens, as well as other agricultural products, was great enough to keep prices so high in Adwa that local consumers were complaining.

19. Consumer items coming from Eritrea included washing powder, chewing gum, henna, sandals, and sweaters manufactured in Asmara. Dates from the Sudanese border were also mentioned as an item coming from the Eritrean side. Consignments of liquor manufactured in Asmara are recorded at the border, but tax is paid in Mekelle.

20. An interesting exception to the fixed percentage taxes was the tax imposed on salt coming from Massawa. For this item, a straight 19.50 EB per quintal tax was being imposed on the Tigrean side of the border, on salt which at that time, March, cost an estimated 45 EB per quintal in Massawa. The reason for this exception was that the price of salt was dropping. The tax also appeared a way to protect the market for Tigray salt, which is brought up from the Danakil by camel. Reports earlier in Addis Ababa had referred to drastically lowered prices for salt in central parts of the country, due to the large quantities coming in from the Sudan in exchange for agricultural goods from the surplus area around Humera. Though the price of salt was again increasing by early June, the quantities coming in from the Sudan had so depressed the price of salt that eventually, we understand, the trade of items into the Sudan had slowed because of lowered demand for the salt. In Tigray in November we had been told that the return load of Massawa salt had been one of the incentives for traders to take grain to the Asmara market, even though the price they could get for teff in Asmara was not much higher than inside Tigray. (Prices would have been higher in Asmara but for the massive sales of relief grain into the market there, which depressed what might otherwise have been much higher prices for locally grown cereals.) It was not clear whether the changes in the value of salt had thus affected the movement of cereals from central surplus areas into Eritrea or not, but the indication was that teff was still a significant item moving to Asmara. Reports from Asmara for this same period also indicated that teff and other cereals were certainly still arriving across the border, though some of this may have been coming from Axum and Adwa (as mentioned above).

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21. Smuggling of various goods goes on, but we were unable to get any estimates concerning the volume of this kind of trade.

22. The extremely strict EPLF regulations on cutting trees in Eritrea, which appear to be enforced firmly, have led to a greater demand for wood and charcoal from Tigray. Though people are forbidden by the authorities to move charcoal and wood officially across the border (only lumber can be exported north), they are certainly being smuggled, in amounts obviously difficult to estimate. As charcoal at the time of our visit was said to fetch 150 EB a bag in Eritrea, and an equivalent amount in the market in Mekelle went for approximately 30-35 EB, smuggling this item into Eritrea was very attractive. We were not able to get any comparative information on previous movement of firewood or charcoal from Tigray to Eritrea.

D. NORTH WOLLO

23. Though not recovering at anything like the rate of the economy in Tigray, there is a noticeable increase in trade and activity in the main towns along the highway through North Wollo. Woldiya is the location of an immense Tuesday market, with people coming in very large crowds from quite a distance. This kind of gathering would have been impossible during the war, and was a reminder of the return to normal of the markets and the important social function of the market for people of the countryside, as a place to exchange news, and to hear about crop and livestock conditions in a wide area.

24. As touched upon in the description of the relief operation in North Wollo in Part I of this report, and in the November Situation Report, traditional survival tactics are important in this area of poor harvests. Migration for labour possibilities is part of this, as are various types of off-farm activity, though these are limited because of the general continuing lack of economic activity in the area. Dessalegn and de Waal both discuss this important subject of survival tactics, which in many cases are basic aspects of life even in good years.

25. Migration from the Sekota area takes the form of men travelling to Gojjam or Gondar, or east to Korem, to work as labourers, often travelling, we were told, with all of their family. This migration is usually to the same location each year, with families returning to their land in Wag in time to prepare their land for the Meher season planting. As crop production is described as rarely sufficient for a full year, this is a regular coping strategy, with payment being made in food from the later harvest. More and earlier preparation of fields is done in areas receiving good Belg rain, even if there is no Belg planting, something which creates some of the labour possibilities in other areas, especially in areas where there are farmers well off enough to own several oxen. It is very possible

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that the presence of these migrant workers may even be necessary for the high production levels of these surplus areas in Gondar and Gojjam. Thus there is a symbiotic relationship between surplus and deficit areas. Migration of labour from Wollo is usually looked at as a necessity for the Wollo farmer, not as a part of this pattern of agricultural production in neighbouring areas. There was intense activity in the fields in Gondar, involving much larger numbers of ploughing teams than we had seen anywhere in South or North Wollo, when we passed through the eastern highland area in April.

26. For some lowland areas of North Wollo, such as around Kobo, labour migration possibilities were expected to be curtailed this Belg season by the lack of rain, as there was not expected to be much harvesting work in the nearby areas. When there is not much local work, labour migrants need to travel further, and this year there were few places anywhere within North Wollo to find farming work. This was also true last Meher when there was not much harvesting in area. Some may have travelled to other places for work, but traditional labour migration patterns appear to be within a relatively restricted area.

27. In Lalibela, where we were told that migration from Lasta for labour purposes follows the same pattern as from Wag, to Gondar, Gojjam, or other better off awrajas of Wollo. Since this is easier than before, people are returning to the patterns of migration that existed before the war. As one administrator told us, people can now go anywhere, though they will still face suspicion when they arrive in a very different area. This would explain the pattern described of movement to the same area each year.

28. While migration out of the area is taking place, there is a steady flow of people returning to North Wollo from resettlement areas and elsewhere.

29. There is no standard profile of people returning, in large numbers, from resettlement areas. Some were able to sell crops, either still standing in the fields or harvested, before they left, and are coming with resources, building up family animal holdings, or making possible new building or general improvement to the older farm. In other cases, those from resettlement are a burden on the community, and are frequently pointed out as such by administration officials who are especially concerned about the fact that these people, like returning ex-soldiers, have no land allotted to them. In some areas this is changing, though the pressure of population on land means that new allotments are very small. In some cases we found that land had been held and worked by some member of the family while the family member was absent.

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30. We were able to learn more about one family who had returned from a resettlement area in Illubabor through a visit to a small Agau community in Wag, several hours by mule from the main road. We were struck by the depth of what we had often heard about, the attachment of the highland farmers in Wollo to their land. As in many other cases, the pull of their own land meant that they had left a better life in the resettlement area to return. Although self-sufficiency was clearly a high value, the family also put a value on education for their children, so that younger sons would be able to follow the same pattern as their older brother, who had worked for some years in Addis Ababa, and had returned with enough savings to purchase several oxen. They were concerned about the fact that the local school, several hours walk away, only went up to the second grade, and the only way they could get any kind of further education for their children was by entering the boys in the nearby traditional church school. The whole family had voluntarily resettled in 1984, except for one son, who had stayed behind to work the family land. The father of the family returned each year from the resettlement area to visit the family land, and when the son had enough harvest to provide seed for wider planting, and conditions were seen to have improved, most of the family returned. Thus it appears that there were more factors than simply the change of government policy in March 1990 that caused people to start returning from resettlement areas in large numbers. Some of the family had remained in Illubabor, and the father had recently gone back to the resettlement region to convince members of the family who had stayed behind that they should return to Wollo.

31. Families and individuals returning to the countryside of this remote area have had exposure in other parts of the country to other levels of social services and often to wider possibilities of off-farm work. This may well have both raised expectations of what they might expect of government in their home areas (such as from the Ministry of Health clinics), and raised expectations of what they can do for themselves, as they increasingly see the value of off-farm work as way to reinvest in the farm (something which according to Dessalegn and de Waal is traditionally not as widespread in Wollo as in Tigray).

32. Ex-soldiers were given as a problem in many parts of North Wollo, even when they were not present in large numbers. The problems they cause are out of proportion to their numbers, as they are a highly visible problem for local officials. In most of the area they are not receiving any official assistance. Any security problems in the area, though this is limited, are linked to the ex-soldiers, as they reportedly turn to banditry. In the towns they continue the kind of behaviour which made them heartily disliked in many garrison towns before the end of the war, and that is drinking in the town bars and then refusing to pay. They often try to intimidate the EPRDF administrators and council members, which is perhaps one of the reasons they are a

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36. As in other Tigrean towns spruced up for the 17th anniversary of the founding of the TPLF in February, there had been some painting and whitewashing of the houses in Abi Adi. The increase in the number of private trucks running between Abi Adi and Mekelle plays an important role linking the area to the outside. The previous isolation due to transport constraints was one of the things most often stressed by those we spoke to before. The trucks both bring supplies and provide passenger transport, charging 15 EB one way to Mekelle. The regular truck traffic reflects the fact that in Abi Adi there is enough spending power, increased in part because of remittances, to create a need to bring in trading goods, and enough demand for transport by people moving to and from the town, to make it worth their while providing this service.

37. Big nurseries for tree seedlings and vegetable plots are situated near the river. Telecommunications have improved, and telephone contact with even Addis Ababa is possible, in contrast to Sekota, where telephone contact is very limited. Electricity supplies are regular. Many people are coming from Addis Ababa and elsewhere for visits or returning back to live in the town, including, surprisingly, a lot of young people. At the same time, some of the many people from Abi Adi who went to the Sudan are choosing to stay there, as they have jobs which they do not want to leave.

38. Though trade has picked up in Abi Adi, and many more items were for sale in reasonably well-stocked town stores (a reflection of the money going back to the area and available to be invested in retail businesses), trade is still slow. The items for sale are still expensive, and most people cannot afford the goods. The volume of trade is noticeable low, though it may be that as in many other towns we visited, commercial activity is only significant on market days. There is no sign of the items that EDDC (the Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation) was expected to bring, but cotton products, which were not available in November, are available though expensive. There has been an increase in the number of small businesses, tea shops, and beer houses, but there is a big problem of housing for those hoping to start new businesses. The flour mills have been improved, and increased in number. There are now four mills, with a fifth under construction. (In Sekota there is only one flour mill, and only one other in the whole of the rest of Wag.)

39. There is a lot of building construction and repair going on in the town, but most is limited to the sturdy traditional stone masonry which uses mud, straw and dung as a mortar. Few people can afford cement. The supply of corrugated iron sheeting is a serious problem, because even those who can afford it have no access to any, and houses which are being built often get halted at the stage of having no roof. Otherwise, we were told, more building would be going on. A market hall which had been started

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by November was not yet in use, because of this problem of obtaining iron sheeting for the roof.

40. The crucial road improvements on the road to Abi Adi from Mekelle had well started by the time we travelled along this stretch in late March, but except for the rough grading and filling in of some of the worst stretches on the part leading down to the lowlands, most of the work was concentrated at the end closest to Mekelle. (Work on the worst part of the road, though basic, was clearly enough to have made it possible for more trucks to choose to make the trip in to Abi Adi, though as suggested above, this may have had more to do with the attraction of regular business in Abi Adi, than the condition of the road.) No work appeared to be in progress on the broken bridges in the lowlands, thus the improved road will not mean rainy season access this year. Trade and contact with the rest of Tigray will be further increased when the road to Adwa, now under repair, is reopened.

Sekota, Wag awraja, North Wollo

41. The period of extreme isolation in Sekota continued for some time after our November visit, until a visit from the Prime Minister's office in February. We were told by the people that "For a long time no-one was thinking of us". Thus changes in the area are only recent, dating for the most part from this February government visit. People of the area are said to have told the visiting government delegation that "we were promised much, we suffered; we supplied the fighters," and to have accused the Transitional Government of neglect. Now there is electricity few a few hours on some evenings, the water system is being improved, there is limited telephone contact for a few hours a day, and road works were going on. We were struck by the fact that the previous lack of attention again disproves the widespread attitude in Addis Ababa that resources were being sent in large amounts to areas that had supported the EPRDF during the war, since Sekota is described as the cradle of the EPDM, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement, which is part of the EPRDF.

42. In terms of economic activity in Sekota, there is a big Tuesday market, but otherwise there are not many people in the town itself except on days when relief distributions are being held. Construction materials are still a big problem. The merchants' trucks which go in to the town to purchase relief wheat go in empty, a contrast to the two way traffic of goods and people to Abi Adi. Physically the town looks a little better attended to, with some painting going on, including some traditional whitewashing around the windows of the distinctive two-story stone houses.

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43. Some trade connects Sekota with the region: we were told that merchants were buying lentils and beans grown in the area, since there is a high value for weight (in contrast to barley and locally grown wheat which is cheaper near Kobo), but in fact a lot of the trade which we viewed during our visit is in relief supplies, as described below. The other items alone are not enough to bring the merchants, though there is small scale trade of these items, either by pack animal transport, or using the "town" truck, the single truck which makes regular trips in and out of the area, usually to Kobo, but at intervals to Dessie. The larger number of merchant trucks (about ten while we were there) only come for distributions. The "town" truck (in itself an improvement over November, when nearly the only trucks coming in were the relief trucks of the JTO, Joint Transport Operation, which were strictly monitored and could not carry goods or passengers) transports things for local merchants, but at a very high rate of 20 EB per quintal (which is another hindrance for trade and the economy, since at this rate not much profit is possible). When the other trucks come they charge 10 EB per quintal as tariff to Kobo, and some local people take advantage of this rate.

44. According to the EPRDF Administrator in Sekota, transport and communication are still the biggest problems. There are not enough grinding mills, as there is only the one in Sekota mentioned above, and one small one in Andework (in the western woreda of Dehana), but none in rural areas. The most important road construction planned is on the road between Sekota and Mekelle, which was once an important link. When this road is open, it will be significant for the economy of the area. We were aware in Mekelle that there was already a certain amount of trade coming from Sekota, via traditional pack animal trails, along which mule trains bring honey, lentils, and beans.

45. Concerning the relief supplies being sold out of Sekota, as described in Part I of this report a large part of the sales of relief grain in the town is a result of people coming long distances by foot, who sell their rations in order to purchase food in their own areas, rather than try to transport it back. Other people sell part of their rations to purchase certain consumer items they need, such as thread or clothing. This explains a certain amount of the food for sale, but the quantity on the market at the time of the March distribution, and a close scrutiny of the little information available on population figures in the area (which show that a high percentage of the population is listed as in need), suggest that there may also be a case of over-distribution going on. (For population estimates, based on Central Statistical Authority figures, see Appendix 1.) Though a cause for concern, the wheat sales are one of the only things helping the economy of the area. When the local administrator and local council members were asked whether efforts had been made to at least restrict the sales of wheat to the people

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of the area, they pointed out that there is so little purchasing power in the area that people selling their relief grain would get an even lower price for it than they currently do selling to the merchants from outside the area, since people of the area could not pay the 26 EB per bag (52 EB per quintal or 100 kg) that they can get because of the increased demand when the traders come from Korem or even further away. The officials felt that even if the merchants were restricted from buying the food aid, it would most likely still leave the area one way or another, by donkey or mule, and neither the beneficiaries nor the other people of the area would benefit. But as was pointed out by one person working in the area, the people are "under the thumb of the merchants", since there is so little competition.

46. Local authorities in Sekota are very suspicious of the attitude of central ministries and government departments. They complained that letters had been written to Ethiopian Airlines, regarding improvements needed on the air strip so that planes could once again land in Sekota, but no answer had been received. Other department representatives come, they said, but usually there is no follow-up. The general tendency, they say, is just reports, no action. They see as sabotage on the part of the Highways Authority the fact that they sent in "the worst equipment" to repair the roads, equipment which was breaking down frequently, and when sent to Kobo for repairs was suspected of being diverted for use in that area. Whatever the truth, this was viewed seriously enough as sabotage that the representative of the Highways Authority in Sekota was arrested for a time by local government authorities, and was therefore unavailable for comment while we were there. The other side of the story is that Sekota authorities were not taking into consideration constraints on the central Highways Authority: much of their equipment is several years old, and it wears out quickly in heavy road works.

Lalibela, Lasta awraja, North Wollo

47. Economic and social conditions in Lalibela were not discussed in the November report, as a visit was not made on that field trip (a brief visit had been made in July).

48. Lalibela provides another contrast to Abi Adi. Though it shares certain characteristics with Sekota, it had its own distinct experience during the war, when as a revered religious centre it was spared government bombing. Thus though run-down, there was not the kind of widespread structural damage of Abi Adi, Sekota, or other towns in the war zone. Over the centuries it has been more isolated than Sekota, which had been a traditional crossing point of several trading routes, and though Lalibela received more attention when tourist possibilities were being encouraged before the revolution of 1974, it was neglected for many years. The town has little economic significance.

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49. Many of the current physical conditions in the town, including the fact that there is still only one generator, and that one being the one at the main tourist hotel, are identical with those described by visitors to Lalibela over twenty years ago. As the EPRDF administrator in Lalibela put it, the problems are those which have been historically present, but in spite of visits of government offices and donors, "there is still no transport, no electricity, no water, no education, in fact, nothing." Everyone talks about the problems, and there is no action. He felt that getting programmes moving needed agitation, and then careful monitoring, as even the existing road improvements were happening at a very slow pace, and townspeople questioned the quality of the road being produced: though it was being leveled and in parts widened, the existing gravel cover was being removed, which unless replaced would mean that the road would be less passable than ever during the rainy season. The local council executive seemed to feel that under the Transitional Government, emphasis was on "the political condition", not development.

50. Among the priorities expressed by the Lalibela local council is a feeding centre for the children, who they say, are "mostly malnourished". Neither MSF France nutritional survey figures for the area, nor our own impressions justify the request, which is more a reflection of the expectations set up in the past by NGOs working in the area during and after the famine operation of 1984/85. Relations with MSF France, who are firm about a low-level intervention, to assist the Ministry of Health but not set up non-sustainable structures, were strained because of these earlier expectations: the council envisions NGOs arriving with not just lots of food for feeding programmes, but money or food for work to employ several hundred townspeople in their programmes, as in the past.

51. Water is a major problem, and affects the programmes of agencies working in Lalibela such as MSF France as well as the rest of the population. EWWCA apparently came in early April, and studied the situation, but has no budget for repairs. At present water is moved up from the low-lying river to the town in a system using three small generators and a lot of pipe. (Reports in May indicated that part of this system had broken down, and that the water problem is now even more serious). Road repairs were started in early February, but many complained that "the work is not active" (they blame the lack of monitoring), and there have been many delays. From discussions with the road crew, and with water works crews in Sekota, there is clearly low incentive for those working in outlying regions to work effectively. One water engineer spoke longingly of the good old days of about thirteen years ago, when UNICEF gave bonuses to government workers employed in projects funded by them, and "15 to 16 boreholes a month could be drilled", in contrast to the present rate of one borehole a month.)

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52. With regard to electricity, promises of a bigger generator from ELPA had been received, but though some of the equipment for an improved system had been brought in, the generator had not arrived "because of the condition of the road".

53. Increasing but still small numbers of people come as tourists, but few visitors are there to talk to the representatives about conditions in the area. Those that do come for the latter purpose only set up expectations on the part of the local people that development projects will follow.

54. The market does not have a big impact in the area, since it is so isolated, and except as part of a weekly market, few consumer goods are for sale. Though merchant trucks come from Woldiya to purchase some agricultural items, there is no flow of food aid out of the area as there is from Sekota. As people here must also walk long distance to collect their rations, this is perhaps a reflection of the fact that a smaller portion of the population is included on the beneficiary lists, and needs are at least as great as presently estimated by relief officials.

VI. MINISTRY OF HEALTH - CHANGES WITHIN THE TIGRAY BRANCH

1. This section concentrates on three sides of the current medical situation in Tigray, and these are the change of management style since the setting up of the integrated Ministry made up of MOH and TPLF field trained hospital staff which has replaced the TPLF fighters in the management of the hospitals, the cutbacks in the budget from the central ministry, and what many observers worry is a decline in the level of health care in the region since these changes.

2. Within the integrated MOH, there has been a definite shift in power, visible in the hospital management, since the description given in the November Situation Report of the evolving relationship between the fighters and returning or reassigned MOH staff in the November Situation Report. By the time of our visit in March, power was firmly in the hands of the returning MOH staff. The MOH was clearly trying to get away from the previous cumbersome big hospital meetings made up of all the fighters, which had decided on matters relating to the running of the hospital. An example of the new system was a small committee in Adigrat hospital, exclusively made up of top medical staff, and excluding even the TPLF hospital administrator, which now ran the hospital. A problem foreseen by some observers was that since now members of sub-committees on various matters are appointed, not elected, staff used to the old way will not accept the authority of these committee decisions. On a very positive side, there were many badly needed decisions that were never made in the past, for example rearranging wards, because of the committee

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system. But there was concern among some observers that this was leading to declining health services due to morale, which is affected by this kind of management style.

3. Even MOH members referred to the fact that in spite of forty-seven doctors being sent to Tigray, there is a declining standard of health care. This is attributed to various factors, not just new management methods. Some suggest that in contrast to the dedicated TPLF fighters, MOH staff are not motivated, and are seen as more interested in their salaries than in the work. Some suggest that though MOH has the upper hand this is not worth very much since they are seen as not having very much for the people.

4. Many of the fighters who had been involved in the hospitals are going back to school for further training, realizing that they have to bring their qualifications up to regain a foothold in influence and authority. Those who stayed in the hospitals are now part of the MOH paid staff, some with position titles which raised eyebrows among staff of MOH Addis Ababa, who complained that there was no such thing as an "assistant surgeon", the term thought up to cover the very valuable position filled by TPLF field trained surgeons without formal credentials.

5. A subject intensely under discussion at the time of our visit was the recent cut-backs in MOH budgets country-wide, which were expected to have an especially severe effect in Tigray unless alternate funds could be found to keep up services which had been in effect under TPLF during the war. The most hard hit area was that of in-hospital feeding, with drastic cuts in the numbers of beds in each of the four hospitals that the budget would now cover.

6. The background to the problem was described by the MOH Head Administrator in Mekelle: the central budgets allocated for Tigray before 1974 were always very poor, and continued to be so under the Derg. But while the Derg was in Tigray, since the hospitals were used for the army, there had been a special fund for the hospitals, which were thus subsidized, since it was clear that the actual MOH budgets were meaningless. This had applied to Mekelle, Adigrat and Adwa. When the Derg was driven out, TPLF subsidized the hospitals in modest way. In-patient bed numbers had doubled, and as many observers have agreed, there was good hospital care, including feeding, under the TPLF. When EPRDF took control of Addis Ababa, an agreement was reached with the Ministry of Health that MOH was to take care of all the hospitals in Tigray, which were to be run in the way TPLF had been running them. This agreement should have been in effect since July, but there had been no action up to December. EPRDF had continued to subsidize the hospitals to the end of December, and then had finally announced to MOH that it was no longer willing to do this, that EPRDF could not afford the funds, and that the hospitals were the responsibility of the MOH. At that

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point it became clear that in spite of the agreements reached, MOH would not be able to fulfil its commitments, because of financial constraints.

7. Thus by March, though running costs had been sent, and medicines, totalling 800,000 EB per year (an allocation of 30-40 cents per Tigrean per year), there were massive cuts in money for in-hospital feeding, something which is not covered by MOH elsewhere in the country. As a result, a hospital such as the one in Adigrat, which had 250 in-patients in the past, was now told by MOH that it could have a budget of 99,000 EB a year for in-patients (basically feeding), an amount not even enough to cover the regular number of in-patient beds for two months. The hospitals have been minimizing admissions of in-patients, and cutting back feeding, by such things as limiting meat to twice a week. Adigrat hospital continued to get certain subsidies from REST and until its withdrawal in March, MSF Belgium/Holland. Budgets had just been received for workers additional to the regular MOH staff, that is workers under TPLF and support staff. EPRDF was also giving loans to help with expenses until April, and Maichew health centre would have been closed otherwise. Since emergency funds have been received by MOH earmarked for Tigray, it was felt that these should be used to cover the costs of clinics in the region. As can be seen from the above, the situation was complicated, and revolved around continuing a level of in-hospital feeding not available elsewhere in the country. But for the regional TPLF authorities, it was yet another example of the central ministries reneging on promises that had been made.

8. While the feeding problem was being dealt with, the UNICEF faffa programme, which assisted hospitals as well as clinics, was unfortunately going to be insignificant compared to the greater hospital feeding needs. The programme, though into operation, had met several other problems as well, with MOH in Mekelle pointing out that costs for such things as transport, feeding and cooking utensils, registration books, or the salaries of store keepers, had not been provided. There was no transport budget for staff from Mekelle to go out to check what was happening with the programme in other areas. Money for loading faffa on transport that had been provided by MSF had come from REST. It was suggested that if UNICEF's agreement with MOH had been that MOH was to cover these costs, UNICEF could have helped the regional office by monitoring to make sure that funds were available and that they reached Tigray.

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VII. THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT SITUATION, DONOR ATTITUDES, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PROGRAMMES

A. CONSTRAINTS TO DONOR RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

1. This section examines donor response to needs in Tigray and North Wollo in the context of the current development policy environment in Ethiopia as a whole.

2. As mentioned in the introduction, donors in Ethiopia are waiting for the political structures at the regional level to emerge, to see how this will affect development policy. In addition, factors which did not apply in Tigray or North Wollo, namely insecurity and the relations between different groups in other parts of the country, have led donors to feel that the time is not right for starting new programmes. Though few are willing to say outright that development efforts will be delayed until the end of the Transitional phase of government, this is de facto what is happening. Any new plans that donors are developing are usually for very small-scale projects, linked with rehabilitation, and progressing so slowly that they may not be implemented until the changes spoken of above take place. Thus most internationally funded development in Ethiopia is on hold, except for those projects which have been underway for some time. Though certain donors are firm that their on-going programmes have not changed, these were very modest by 1991. A factor which may change this static situation is the recent lifting of the Brook amendment in the United States, which has released American development money for Ethiopia. For many years only emergency programme funds have been available from this source. USAID involvement in development assistance may lead the way for other donors.

3. To even start rational planning for new projects, donors will need to know not just the details of future government structures, but also what donor relations will be with the new regional governments, how responsibilities will be shared between the regions and the central ministries, how this will affect current arrangements with the central ministries, and so forth. Even for funding community level development projects, there is a need to know what the legal status of grassroots organizations will be, now that former structures such as service cooperatives have for the most part disbanded. Thus there are inevitable delays at all levels of development planning.

4. Tigray could be an exception to this, but not if donor money for development in this area must come through the central ministries. Alternate routes to ensure that funds are quickly applied to rehabilitation and development projects in Tigray are through REST or one of the NGOs already operational in Tigray.

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5. The reluctance to put development funds into Tigray is in part based on the suspicion of some donors concerning the socialist principles of the regional government. These are indeed in evidence, but there appears to be a pragmatic coexistence between these principles and the great deal of private enterprise which is being encouraged by the regional authorities. Even Tigrean businessmen who at the time of the opening up of Tigray were reluctant to move their capital into the region, now appear, from the evidence of the activity described in an earlier section, to be much more willing to do so.

6. Certain donors who have expressed interest in improving the post-war conditions in Tigray but have no immediate plans for projects in the region give the double explanation of needing the national elections to be held first, and fearing criticism if they appear to be favouring Tigray over other regions. One donor said that his agency well knew that the criticism of "too much going to Tigray" was incorrect, but that people outside of Tigray perceive this as the truth, so that his agency would be criticised if it puts assistance into the area. This donor felt that, anyway, "others are interested in going into Tigray", but when asked to say which donors these might be, was unable to identify any. This is typical of donor attitudes toward development in Tigray at this time, and perhaps applies to North Wollo as well. Everyone assumes that someone else is going to be working there. Alternatively there is the assumption that participating in the World Bank Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Project and providing help for the relief operations is enough of a commitment to the area. As ERRP funds will be through central ministries, and will take a long time for plans to be implemented, there is no immediate impact on the target areas expected. (At least one donor is looking for ways to redirect bilateral funds that they cannot spend in earlier planned projects, into multilateral projects such as the ERRP.)

7. A serious policy decision facing several traditional donors to Ethiopia is whether to put further development funds, especially if these may be limited, into surplus or deficit areas of the country. The large capital intensive highly mechanized projects of the past (which like the SIDA project in Arsi was able to transform a deficit area into a surplus area) are unlikely to be duplicated, so that funds may go, as in traditional World Bank projects in the country, towards further developing surplus areas, with the aim of increasing the total food production in the country. The donors who put a priority on this are unlikely to be looking closely at development possibilities in Tigray or North Wollo.

8. North Wollo has had a history of failed development projects in recent years due to the need of project personnel to withdraw from project areas because of the war, and the consequent deterioration of the unfinished projects or the destruction of

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projects in the middle of the fighting, by retreating troops, or by looting during interim periods when order was not possible. This has hurt the region on two counts. Firstly, the people of the area rarely got any benefit from projects they were involved in, and secondly, the projects were never assessed on their own merits, to see if they were appropriate or not, since they had to be abandoned. Thus donors supporting former projects have no way of judging their actual or potential impact at the time they were hurriedly left, and are not encouraged to follow through in the same areas.

9. Another constraint to getting donor money out of central ministries to what the donors themselves may feel are priority areas of previously war-affected regions such as Tigray or North Wollo is ironically the principle of non-intervention in the work of ministries once general projects or programmes for bilateral aid have been decided upon. Thus for programmes supporting the Ministry of Education, it is left up to the MOE to decide which schools are to get repaired as part of school rehabilitation. Sometimes needs are greater in other parts of the country for reasons that cannot be appreciated by visitors to Tigray viewing war damaged schools with no doors or windows; these are sometimes in better shape than schools built in the last ten years in other regions, when school building programmes switched from the more permanent structures often found in Tigray, made from imported materials, to locally made chika construction, which deteriorate rapidly. Thus donors often cannot impose regional priorities on ministries. A similar situation may face those responsible for deciding on priorities within the Highway Construction Authority: though there is a pressing need for improving the road network in Tigray, the system within the region was actually one of the best in the country at the time of the revolution of 1974, due to the work of the then governor of the region. Thus though little maintenance has been possible for much of the period since then, there are many areas of the country in need of very basic road construction competing for the attention of the Highway Authority. Donors face these questions of competing needs each time a decision on development funds is made. Local government authorities in North Wollo who now complain that donors come to see the needs of their region and then never reappear with money for projects must also keep in mind the fact that donor missions are often assessing the relative merits of working or investing funds in several different areas.

10. Another part of donor attitude which finds a reflection in the lack of funds being directed towards Tigray or North Wollo is the feeling that the emergency focus is no longer needed on the north of the country. The area is no longer the highest area on the agenda for donors, as it was during the time of the Southern Line, now that the donors feel that the relief operations are "running themselves" (though Part I of this report has tried to show that the operations are far from smooth, partly because of

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just this lack of donor focus), and emergencies in other parts of the country have priority. As a result, rehabilitation and development in northern areas are also going to slip down on the agenda.

11. The impact of the continuing economic recession in the West on donor response to development needs is also a factor. Some donor countries appear to be turning inward, and with less attention on the part of the public in these countries going towards the economic woes of developing countries. In some cases, it is very unlikely that relief aid will be replaced by development aid, as donors feel they cannot justify it in the same way to their voters. Many donors are stretched thin by emergency commitments elsewhere, with their tax-payers attention pulled to Southern Africa and Somalia, among other places.

B. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

12. Expectations among local populations of what NGO work in North Wollo can consist were raised by the massive number of rehabilitation projects in the area in the past, started by NGOs who had been working with drought victims and wanted to continue their work in these areas (sometimes to spend funds raised for this purpose from their supporters, sometimes to continue their presence in Ethiopia). Many of these projects had been phased out before the remaining NGOs had to pull out of much of the area in 1988 or earlier. NGOs currently working in the area find their deliberately small scale efforts being compared to former projects in which many people were employed, and even the suggestion that an NGO might move back into an area raises high expectations of large inputs of resources, the start of feeding programmes, and employment possibilities. The concept of sustainability of an NGO project means very little to local authorities under current conditions: they are looking for jobs to be created in the area, and short term immediate returns. So there is a clash of priorities between local officials and NGOs, just as there has been in many cases in the past.

13. There are very few NGOs working in North Wollo, and in places like Korem where at the height of the famine dozens of NGOs were working, there is not a single one present. Whereas donor reluctance to move into the area is partially explained by the factors above, it is less understandable that a year after the war, the area is still empty of NGOs except for MSF France in Sekota and Lalibela. It must be said that working in the region would not be easy for NGOs, in spite of the clear needs of the people. One of the constraints is the current lack of clarity (as the NGOs see it) about the NGOs role in relation to RRC, and what it will be to later regional governments. What say will the regional governments have in agreeing to certain NGO projects? Should work be started when future agreements and perhaps coordination is uncertain? Authorities in the region, especially

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the people's council executives, stress that there are urgent medical and other basic needs there, which will not be filled by MOH or other ministries (including new regional bodies with few resources) in the next few years. Thus NGOs do not run the risk of doing work that should be the responsibility of the government. At the same time, it must be stated that many NGOs are more aware now than they were in the past of the impact of their eventual withdrawal from a project area, something which is examined before a project begins. MSF France is already facing this with reference to the supply of drugs in areas where they work, and are concerned about what will replace this supply in the future. They are there to give support to MOH, not replace them, but are aware that there are not enough resources at the centre. The role of an NGO within the community in this area is not an easy one, because of the expectations on them described above.

14. The number of NGOs in Tigray has not increased substantially over the past months, though several groups have started or are about to begin projects. For the most part, the region depends on its traditional NGO supporters, who helped in cross-border programmes. Exceptions to this are World Vision and Africare; the former is working in the Wukro area, and the latter will be establishing programmes in the same area. We found that there was still some confusion about what the communication lines and formal relationships are to be between NGOs, or Church groups with REST or RRC, and what the relationship of the NGOs will be vis-a-vis the baitos. REST still plays a strong coordinating role, and helps to set priorities. RRC has opened an office in Mekelle, but has few resources.

15. Consideration might be given by donors wishing to support small but long-term projects of the possibility of increasing funds to the Church groups who have a history of development work in the area, something that could be done directly, or through JRP. The advantage of many of the Catholic and Protestant missions in Tigray, and to a smaller extent in North Wollo, is that they can provide some continuity between the past and the future, having a longer-term commitment needed for certain kinds of development than NGO groups which come and go. Church groups also have the advantage of more certainty of on-going funding for projects which they start, whereas many NGOs face frequent funding crises, for political and other reasons. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has its own small but expanding development programme.

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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The current period is a time for donors to be aware of what will be needed in terms of development in North Wollo, even if not much can be done until donors know what regional government structures will be in place in the future. In Tigray, more development work could be supported at the present, using existing structures, with direct support for projects through REST or NGOs.

2. More information is needed on several aspects of possibly changing conditions in the countryside, especially the impact on their home areas of people returning from resettlement areas, and the return to older patterns of migration of labour. More information is also needed on the impact of labour on production patterns in surplus areas to which the labour migrates. Studies could call on the resources of the University of Addis Ababa Sociology Department, and the Institute of Development Research.

3. Donors should be aware of expectations built up in a community when they visit without plans of responding to needs they ask about.

4. The United Nations could take the lead in helping to get proper surveys of northern areas done, something which has not been possible for many years. More data is needed for both rational planning of relief operations and longer term development planning. This will require support to CSA and regional authorities. As studies also raise expectations that something will be done with the results, they may need to be postponed until closer to the time that development programmes are more likely to be implemented in Tigray and North Wollo.

5. To solve problem of central ministries sitting on funds meant for the regions, donors should perhaps do more monitoring in central ministry offices in Addis Ababa, not just in project areas.

6. Consideration should be given to the possibility of using the port of Massawa for supplies and equipment for bilateral and NGO development projects in Tigray. This has met some opposition by certain central ministry officials. At the present, those agencies bringing supplies this way usually need to consign them to REST. Using Massawa would greatly ease development work in Tigray, especially in the neglected western part of the region. There is a need to know the official position of both the ministries and the EPLF on such questions as the regular supplying of projects in Tigray through local purchases in Asmara. As customs duties are imposed on items brought from Eritrea for sale in Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia, perhaps arrangements would have to be made to waive these charges at the Eritrea/Tigray border for development projects. Repairs to

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equipment could be more easily done in Asmara than in Addis Ababa, and this too will need policy decisions. As of early June, negotiations on these matters were going on in Addis Ababa.

7. When the North Wollo economy and development needs are contrasted to those of Tigray, there is clearly a need for basic services in North Wollo, such as improved telecommunications, electricity supply, and other infrastructure, which are now being put in place in many parts of Tigray. The problem for North Wollo is that except for the Ethiopian Relief Organization (ERO), there is no-one to push for them, to be their advocate, in the centre.

8. For future seed programmes, consideration should be taken of the alternative to purchasing and moving seed around the country, through carefully monitored money to farmers for purchase of seed locally. This is more appropriate for several reasons: the best variety is often locally adapted seed, and local purchase avoids the problems of logistical constraints on moving seed at the right time.

9. As mentioned in previous reports, there is a great need for small projects which will have an impact of women, such as grinding mills, credit schemes, and assistance to day care centres in the towns which would free women for work or training.

10. Donor support is urged for food for work in Tigray, in the form of support to communities now carrying out large public works on a voluntary basis.

11. For reforestation projects now being implemented, or under consideration for the future, an agency active in this field has the following suggestions for best results: attention should be given at the start to establish good seed collection, so that strong seedlings are produced in the nurseries - if seedlings do not survive they are useless, and the farmers will not plant seedlings again in the future; seedlings should be given at the right time, with explanations to the farmers about the right time to plant; the farmers should be given the species they want, as these will receive the best attention (care should be taken to avoid the usual central syndrome of forcing people to take what the experts think is best); the distribution system for seedlings must be as widespread as possible, so that seedlings do not die during long trips of several days walk back from distribution points; farmers must be well taught about the watering of seedlings, to differentiate between those that need lots of water, and other types which will suffer from overwatering. The agency stressed that if farmers are forced to take the wrong kind of seedling, they will not return for more seedlings the next year, and also emphasises that the farmer is the best source of information about what are the most appropriate and needed trees in their own area, knowledge that goes back for generations.

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APPENDIX 1 - POPULATION

A. TIGRAY - ESTIMATED POPULATION FIGURES (TPLF COMPARED TO CSA)

17 May 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

Population figures - TPLF estimates given in "Independent Crop Assessment Mission, Eritrea and Tigray, November/December 1990", by John Wilding and Trish Silkin for the CDR Resource Group, and in chart giving Population and Livestock Distribution in Tigray, Annex III, UN/EPPG Tigray Situation Report for February 1992.

CSA - Central Statistical Authority

AWRAJA	TPLF ESTIMATE 1990	CSA (c. 1989/90)
ADWA	1,120,000	560,000
AGAME	460,000	390,000
AXUM	360,000	350,000
ENDERTA	1,040,000	400,000
KILTE AWLALO	360,000	240,000
RAYA	380,000	150,000
SHIRE	420,000	320,000
TEMBIEN	280,000	320,000
TSELEMTI-SEMIEN	200,000	
WOLKAIT	200,000	
TOTAL	4,820,000	2,730,000(1)

NOTE: (1) CSA total for Tigray does not include Wolkait and Tselemti-Semien, which would bring their figure for total population of Tigray to 3,130,000. Several sources, including Africa Watch, agree with TPLF's assertion that the Ethiopian government deliberately underestimated the population of Tigray in the past.

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APPENDIX 1, POPULATION FIGURES, Continued

B. NORTH WOLLO - SUMMARY OF POPULATION DIFFERENCES - 1984, 1989, 1991

Old awrajas - those existing before administrative changes of 1988. Used by JRP. Population figures from CSA census of 1984. (1)

New awrajas - those created when new administrative system set up in 1988, when Wollo divided into North and South Wollo. Populations per awraja are CSA estimates for 1989 (from Statistical Bulletin 72) based on 1984 census.

Population figures for 1991 are EPPG estimates, calculated using 1984 census figures and CSA weights (1984 estimates multiplied by 1.147 for 1989 rural population estimates, 1989 figures multiplied by 1.057). To be considered very tentative estimates.

CSA - Central Statistical Authority

5 June 1992/D.Hicks/UN/EPPG

	Estimated population			
	1984 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG old awrajas	CSA 1989 est. (new awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG new awrajas
RAYA AND KOBO AND WEFLA:				
Raya and Kobo (old)	173,650	210,000		
Raya and Kobo (new)			283,055	300,000
Raya and Kobo (old) + Wefla	T[280,338]	[340,000]		
Wefla - old	106,688	130,000		
YEJU AND AMBASSEL:				
TOTAL	T [618,385]	[682,000]	T[645,454]	[682,000]
Yeju (old)	259,474	315,000		
Yeju (new)			346,505	366,000
Yeju (old) + Ambassel (old)	[618,385]	[750,000]		
Ambassel (old)	358,911	435,000		
Ambassel (new)			298,949	316,000

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	Estimated population			
	1984 pop. (old awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG old awrajas	CSA 1989 est. (new awraja boundaries)	1991 estimate EPPG new awrajas
WAG:				
Wag (old)	230,373	280,000		
Wag (old) without Wefla	[123,685]	[150,000]		
"Wag" (new) (3 awrajas)			T[246,374]	[260,400]
break down:				
Wefla	[106,688]	[130,000]	118,654	125,400
Wag (Sekota)	[67,714]		69,708	73,700
Dehana	[55,971]		58,012	61,300
LASTA AND WADLA				
TOTAL:	T[627,387]	[761,000]	T[567,864]	[600,200]
Lasta (old)	392,269	476,000		
Wadla (old)	235,118	285,000		
New awrajas break down:				
Lasta (new)			170,089	180,000
Meket and Wadla (new)			250,012	264,200
Delanta and Dawent (new)			147,763	156,000
TOTALS				
NORTH WOLLO:	1,290,884	1,565,000	1,443,798	1,526,000
plus				
Ambassel (SOUTH WOLLO)	358,911	435,000	298,949	316,000
GRAND TOTAL	1,649,795	2,000,000	1,742,747	1,842,000

NOTES
(1) from RRC/EPPG Vulnerability Profile of Wollo, 1986 (CSA figures for 1984, subtracting official numbers of people resettled 1984-85)
[ ] indicates figures in artificial geographical groupings to be able to compare RRC and JRP figures: either numbers broken down by old woredas or new awrajas, or T[ ] as totals for comparison.
COMMENT: Population figures were considered to be very rough estimates even at the time of the 1984 census.

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APPENDIX 2 - BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING

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REST. Papers of the REST and TDA Symposium on Combatting Environmental Degradation, held in Mekelle, Tigray, April 15-20, 1992. [With focus on grassroots participation.] Papers will be available in the future.

CCRDA

REST. Various "Updates" available through the REST Information Office, Addis Ababa or REST Mekelle. Addis Ababa telephone 51 45 23 or 51 43 78

TTAC. Several useful documents are available through the TTAC (Tigray Transport and Agricultural Consortium), whose offices are in the same building as REST in Addis Ababa. Telephone 51 42 21.

UN/EPPG Situation Report for Tigray and North Wollo, July 1991. Written by Deborah Hicks. [Includes a description of the general agricultural development philosophy of TPLF and REST, and the structure of Tigrean society.] Addis Ababa.

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See also the libraries and resources of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies and the Institute of Development Research, at the University of Addis Ababa.

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APPENDIX 3 - LIST OF PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

Personnel of the following ministries, government departments, NGOs and Church groups were of great assistance. In addition, townspeople and farmers in various locations were consulted on many different occasions.

TIGRAY

Ministry of Agriculture, Mekelle, Mahoni, Maichew, Abi Adi and Agame awraja
Ato Berhanu Haile, Regional Head, Mekelle

REST, Relief Society of Tigray, Mekelle
Ato Abraha Haile-Mikael, outgoing Head
Ato Chekol Kidane, Acting Head

ECS/JRP, Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat/Joint Relief Partnership
Abba Hagos Woldegiorgis, Director for Tigray

Ministry of Health, Mekelle and Adigrat

Baito members in several locations, including Mahoni

EPRDF Administrator, Maichew

RRC Branch Head, Mekelle

Democratic Women's Association of Tigray, Mekelle

Customs officer, Zala Ambasa, Agame awraja

Missionaries of Africa, (White Fathers), Adigrat

Monseigneur Kidane-Mariam Tekle-Mariam, Catholic Bishop, Adigrat

JRS, Jesuit Relief Services, Adigrat

MSF, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Holland/Belgium, Mekelle
Lori Bell, coordinator

Little Sisters of the Assumption, Idega Hamus, Agame awraja

GTZ, German Technical Assistance

Italian Cooperation

NORTH WOLLO

Ministry of Agriculture, Woldiya

Local people's council (shengo) members in Alamata, Kobo, Sekota, Lalibela, Korem

CCRDA

Ministry of Health, Lalibela

EPRDF Administrators in Sekota, Lalibela, and Woldiya

EWWCA and WASSA in Sekota

MSF France, Medecins Sans Frontieres France, Sekota and Lalibela

Missionaries of Charity, Alamata

SOUTH WOLLO

SCF UK, Dessie

RRC Branch Head, Dessie

JRP, Dessie

Ministry of Agriculture, Dessie

ADDIS ABABA

FAO, UN Food and Agricultural Organization

WFP, UN World Food Programme

LWF/JRP, Lutheran World Federation/Joint Relief Partnership

CRS, Catholic Relief Services

GTZ, German Technical Assistance

REST, Relief Society of Tigray
Ato Teklewoini Assefa, Head
Ms Fiona Meagan, Information Officer

ERO, Ethiopian Relief Organization

MSF France, Medecins Sans Frontieres, France

SCF/UK, Save the Children Fund, U.K.


OXFAM

UNDP, United Nations Development Program

Various donors - USAID, EEC, SIDA, Canadian Embassy, and others

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TIGRAY
SERAYE
ADI KWALA
TACH ADIABO
HADEGTI
SEYEMT ADIABO
LAY ADIABO
SHIRE
MEDEBAY TABOR
LAY KERARO
MARAY
LAD MAYCHEW
TACH KERARO
AXUM
TACH MAYCHEW
ASGDI
TSIMBELA
ZANA
ADET
TSEBERA
TELEMT
DIB BAHIR
BEYEDA
DEMEN
JANAMORA
AWEGERA
SEKOTA
WAG
DEHANA
LIBO
BELESA
ADWARBATE
ADI ABEYTI
IGELA
BIZET
INTICHO
ADWA
HAFTAYLE
AMBA-SENAYITI
INDABATSAHMA
INDAFELASI
AMBERA METEKA
TEMBEN
TENKWAMLASH
ABERGELE
SEHARTI
SELEWA
WEFLA
SENAFE
GOLO MENDIDA
GENTA AFESHUM
AGAME
RUBEIA & SAISAI
HULET BELES
TSADA AMBA
ATSIBI
GERALTA
TSIRA-I
INDERTA
DIDIBA & QERGAJEM
HINTALO
SHEHET
MIRAB
WAJIRAT
AUBALAGE
MEHONE
INDAMEHONE
CHERCHER
RAYA & AZEBO
RAYA & KOBO
DIDIGSALA
BERAHILE
HULET AWLALO
ANAKIL DEPRESSION
ADMINISTRATION




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Map of Tigray.

Region : NORTHERN WELO


10

10.1 Dahana
10.2 Wag
10.3 Lasta
10.4 Wefla
10.5 Raya & Kobo
10.6 Yeju
10.7 Delanta & Dawent
10.8 Meket & Wadla



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WELO



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OLD AWRAJA BOUNDARIES
ARR-1988